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responsible for World Wars I and II and the Korean war, may have been reduced as a result of the strong U.S. stand on Cuba.

"Looking back on Cuba, what is of concern is the fact that both Governments were so far out of contact, really," the President said.

"I don't think that we expected that he would put the missiles in Cuba, because it would have seemed such an imprudent action for him to take, as it was later proved.

"Now, he obviously must have thought that he could do it in secret and that the United States would accept it. So that he did not judge our intentions accurately."

December 19, 1962: Russia and Cuba have agreed to an increase in trade in 1963 which will enable Cuba to "overcome the imperialist economic blockade," it was announced here today.

The announcement said full agreement had been reached on main problems of Russian-Cuban trade in 1963 and on questions relating to credits and transports of goods to and from Cuba.

December 20, 1962: Former U.S. Surg. Gen. Leonard Scheele accompanied Negotiator James B. Donovan to Havana today from Miami in an effort to speed liberation of 1,113 Cuban invasion prisoners.

December 20, 1962: Senator BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Republican, of Iowa, said yesterday the Kennedy administration should fully inform Congress of any commitments made during the Cuban crisis that could affect future action against the Castro regime.

December 20, 1962: Senate Democratic Leader MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, indicated in a separate interview that he expects the Kennedy administration to review its actions for the congressional committees directly concerned. But he said he sees little to gain in hashing over all the details of a critical period.

"I think the American people are fairly well satisfied with the results obtained in Cuba," he said. "They are aware of the implication of the policy pursued."

The Kennedy administration said yesterday that if the negotiations are successful for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners it will be due to the private efforts of men and organizations such as James B. Donovan and the American Red Cross.

Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Democrat, of Minnesota, today suggested the Organization of American States negotiate a nuclear arms ban embracing all of Latin America.

"The overwhelming majority of the governments and people of Latin America do not want nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles stored on their soil or readied for use in any other part of Latin America," the Senator said in the closing address of the International Arms Control Symposium at the University of Michigan.

Latin America "is ripe for a regional arms control agreement which would prevent the spread of the nuclear arms race to the Western Hemisphere."

December 21, 1962: The release of 1,113 Cuban prisoners held by Premier Fidel Castro for almost 2 years will begin early Sunday morning, December 23. A formal agreement under which the prisoners were ransomed for \$53 million in food, medicine, and medical supplies was signed in Havana late yesterday.

December 21, 1962: The President and the Prime Minister met in Nassau from December 18 to December 21. They were accompanied by the Secretary of Defense, Mr. [Robert S.] McNamara, Foreign Secretary Lord Home, the Minister of Defense, Mr. [Peter] Thornycroft and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Colonies, Mr. [Duncan] Sandys.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed a wide range of topics. They reviewed the state of East-West relations in

the aftermath of the October crisis in Cuba, and joined in the hope that a satisfactory resolution of this crisis might open the way to the settlement of other problems outstanding between the West and the Soviet Union.

December 21, 1962: The Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda, in one of the bluntest Moscow attacks on the Peking regime, accused Red China and its ally, Albania, of "subversive activities" that seriously endanger world communism.

Pravda cited recent party congresses in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Italy where both Red China and Albania came under open attack for opposing Soviet policy in the Cuban crisis.

Pravda said peaceful coexistence has become the "general line" of foreign policy for Russia and its Communist allies because "socialism and communism do not need wars to demonstrate their superiority over capitalism."

December 22, 1962: A U.S. official source said today the first plane load of Cuba invasion prisoners would be flown to Florida about 8:30 eastern standard time, December 23.

Former President Eisenhower believes truth is a far better weapon in the cold war against communism than managed news.

Mr. Eisenhower said he has no reason to think the American people have not been told the truth on the Cuban situation, but he noted that he doesn't know all the facts.

He said he sees no reason why the administration should not now release a full and official version of what happened in the disastrous attempt to invade Cuba in April 1961. The Bay of Pigs invasion is now history, he said, and the official story should have been told long ago.

December 23, 1962: Prime Minister Fidel Castro, in expansive mood, greeted members of the ransom ship *African Pilot* today and festively declared a 24-hour state of peace with the United States in observance of the goods-for-prisoners exchange.

The 10,000-ton freighter tied up in Havana Harbor at 2:05 p.m. with \$11 million worth of food and drugs as downpayment for the freedom of 1,113 Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion captives.

About 3 hours later, the first flights left a military airbase near Havana carrying liberated prisoners to the United States.

December 23, 1962: United States and Soviet negotiators conferred in an unusual Sunday meeting today but failed to make any progress in their effort to wind up the Cuban crisis by Christmas.

Informed sources said the positions of the two sides remained virtually unchanged following the 2½-hour session held at the Soviet mission headquarters in New York.

The United States was represented by Ambassador Charles W. Yost and Special Representative John J. McCloy. The Soviet delegation was headed by Deputy Foreign Ministers Vasily Kuznetsov and Valerian A. Zorin.

December 24, 1962: Adlai Stevenson, chief U.S. delegate to the United Nations, predicted today there would be another Cuban crisis in 1963—this one a verbal uproar by Castro delegates in the U.N. against continuing American inspection flights over the island dictatorship.

Stevenson said in an interview at his country home near Libertyville, Ill., that he expected the Cubans to attempt to retaliate in the U.N. for the continuing American overflights "which we claim we are entitled to make because of Castro's refusal to give us the right to ground inspection, to which the Russians had acquiesced when they agreed to withdraw their missiles and bombers."

Stevenson said he is convinced that the Soviets have withdrawn all missiles and

bombers, but he said "the big problem in the future is to guard against their reintroduction into Cuba."

December 24, 1962: The last of 1,113 Cuban invasion prisoners ransomed from Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in a Christmas Eve wrapup of a \$53-million airlift to freedom, landed here tonight.

President Kennedy tonight said he was "extremely pleased" that the Cuban prisoners had been released.

In a statement issued here, the President said it was "in the interest of our national principles" that these men had been saved "from a slow death."

December 25, 1962: Agrarian Reform Chief Carlos Rafael Rodriguez has affirmed that Soviet and Czechoslovak aid will enable the Cuban economy to develop at the rate set for next year, the Havana newspaper Hoy reported today.

Rodriguez, president of the Cuban national Agrarian Reform Institute, returned to Havana yesterday from a trip to Moscow and Prague at the head of a Cuban trade delegation.

He told newsmen on his return "this trip has strengthened even more the friendship and cooperation between our respective peoples."

"The results (of the trip) could not be more satisfactory for Cuba since all trade matters for 1963 have been covered," he said.

Premier Fidel Castro switched signals today and told relatives of ransomed invasion prisoners that if they want to go to the United States they must buy their way out of Cuba with their homes and automobiles.

Castro first announced that relatives could obtain an exit permit from Cuba if they presented proof that they were part of the immediate families of invasion prisoners.

Then the offer was changed to exclude all but parents, brothers, wives, and sons when the number of people jamming government offices skyrocketed.

December 26, 1962: The freighter *African Pilot*, packed with 923 Cuban emigrants sailed tonight for Florida. Released by a "Christmas bonus" deal with Fidel Castro, they will rejoin their close relatives, the Bay of Pigs prisoners ransomed earlier this week.

December 26, 1962: Communist China launched a 10-day nationwide support-Cuba campaign today with high praise for Premier Fidel Castro's firmness in the face of what were described as aggressive designs by the United States.

The commentary said the United States "resorted to every means" during the past year to crush the Castro regime. But it failed because of Castro's heroic spirit of daring to struggle and daring to win.

"When the U.S. gunboats bombarded Havana and imposed a military blockade on Cuba, the 7 million Cubans mobilized again and again and armed themselves as one man, preparing resolutely to repulse any aggression from the enemy," the broadcast said.

December 27, 1962: President Kennedy today accepted an invitation from Cuban freedom fighters to inspect their brigade in Miami Saturday and told them he hoped someday to visit a free Cuba.

Manuel Artime, civil head of the brigade, said the President expressed his appreciation "for our heroic efforts which were not only made in behalf of freeing our country but were also in behalf of the free world."

U.S. officials were increasingly optimistic yesterday that 23 Americans long held in Cuban jails may be released.

The optimism was based on reports from lawyer James B. Donovan, who arranged for the return of the Cuban invasion prisoners. Premier Fidel Castro has promised to discuss early release of the Americans, too.

Washington informants said the U.S. Government is also pressing for release of Amer-

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icans through the Swiss Embassy in Havana. The Swiss represent U.S. interests in the absence of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana.

December 27, 1962: Tass reported today that Soviet geologists are looking for oil in Cuba. The dispatch from the official Soviet news agency said they also are prospecting in Cuba for iron, nickel, manganese, copper, and peat.

The dispatch gave this information about other Soviet aid to Fidel Castro's regime:

"The Soviet Union is helping build 16 industrial establishments in the Republic. Three metallurgical works are being reconstructed and enlarged. Two thermal power stations with an aggregate capacity of 800,000 kilowatts are being built. They will start generating in 1964.

"A plant for the manufacture of spares for the machine-building, mining, and sugar industries is scheduled to be commissioned in January 1963."

Tass also said Soviet specialists are helping develop Cuba's fishing industry and agriculture.

December 27, 1962: Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev accused West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer today of trying to start a world war over the Cuban crisis and warned him that West Germany would be snuffed out like a candle in the first few hours of a conflict.

He said Adenauer had tried to torpedo every attempt by the United States and Russia to reach cold war settlements, including Berlin, and said Adenauer was disappointed when the crisis over Cuba was resolved peacefully by both sides making concessions.

Khrushchev leveled the charges in a letter to Adenauer in which the Soviet Premier blamed the West for incidents along the Communist-built wall dividing Berlin.

Khrushchev said that at the time of the Cuban crisis West Germany tried to drive the United States into a corner out of which there was no way but an armed clash.

"All mankind heaved a sigh of relief when both sides through mutual concessions, blunted the dangerous sharpness of the crisis and prevented the worst," Khrushchev wrote.

Communist Training School in Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. WILLIAM G. BRAY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 7, 1963

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, in the growing controversy as to whether long distance missiles remain in Cuba, there is the danger of ignoring a problem which is perhaps more important.

When President Kennedy negotiated with Khrushchev on the removal of the Russian missiles in October, and early November, 1962, there apparently was some understanding or agreement between them about future invasion of Cuba. On October 30, Pravda stated that the United States had agreed to give "guarantee that no aggression will be made against Cuba by the United States or other countries of the Western Hemisphere."

I sent a telegram to President Kennedy asking, in effect, if such a guarantee would protect the expansion of Russian communism in Cuba. A month

later, on November 29, I received a letter in reply to that telegram from Frederick Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State, which stated, among other things:

"Any United States assurance against an invasion of Cuba will not guarantee communism against the united action of freemen in this hemisphere."

This answer is vague. It is now coming to light that there is a situation in Cuba which is endangering freedom in the Western Hemisphere.

Secretary of Defense McNamara, while denying long-distance missiles are in Cuba, admits that there is a build-up of crack combat units of the Russian Army in Cuba, armed with the most modern weapons. He admits that this force of combat troops, in addition to Russian technicians in Cuba, numbers many thousands. Other sources estimate that there are more than 40,000 of these combat troops. This force, also armed with scores of the most modern Russian planes, the Mig-21, is sufficient to have absolute control of Cuba—even against Castro.

Communists also have organized, in Cuba, schools of sabotage, subversion, and revolution. One of the leading instructors is "Che" Guevara, an expert on guerrilla warfare who recently wrote a book on this subject. At least five Russian generals are participating in these schools. Thousands of students are being trained to return to their own countries—Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, and other South and Central American countries—to commit sabotage and lead revolutions. On the last day of January, this school graduated 1,017, each of whom is to become an instructor.

These conditions bring to mind the ominous statement and prophecy made more than 15 years ago by Stanley Mikolajczyk, ex-Premier of Poland. He said of Russian communism:

"In Russia today men and women of every nation are now being trained and schooled for the day when they will return to their native lands, which they know so intimately, to rule under direct command from Moscow. Stalin trains Frenchmen to rule France, Italians to rule Italy, Englishmen to rule England, Latins to rule the Latin countries, Japanese to rule Japan, Chinese to rule China, Indians to rule India, blacks to rule blacks, and Americans to rule America."

Thus Russia has planted in Cuba a vicious school of Communist revolution, training Mexicans to destroy freedom and rule in Mexico, Peruvians in Peru, Brazilians in Brazil, Haitians in Haiti, Nicaraguans in Nicaragua, just as the Polish Premier said, except that this school is conducted within 90 miles of the United States.

Not only does this vicious and secretive Communist attack on our free neighbors of Latin America threaten Western freedom, but allowing this school to operate under our implied protection wrecks the confidence and faith in the United States as the leader of the free world. Perhaps we are spending an undue amount of time worrying about missiles in Cuba and not enough time worrying about the subversive threat which can be far more dangerous to the free world.

The President is aware of this threat.

Under our Constitution the President is the one who must assume leadership and take the appropriate action.

Nurserymen Oppose Changes in Quarantine Restrictions

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. WILLIAM L. ST. ONGE

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 29, 1963

Mr. ST. ONGE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to insert into the Record the text of a resolution adopted by the American Association of Nurserymen at their second legislative conference, held in Chicago on December 18, 1962. The resolution expresses the opposition of the nursery industry to any revisions of quarantine 37 "which would obviate inspection of plant materials at a designated port of entry in the United States."

The resolution was forwarded to me by the Connecticut Nurserymen's Association, whose members believe that loosening the quarantine restrictions may result in the introduction of insect and disease pests from abroad. This is a matter of great concern to nurserymen in Connecticut where nursery farming is a fast-growing activity. Already we have 666 nurseries in our State growing stock on thousands of acres. I believe the Department of Agriculture, and the Plant Quarantine Division in particular, should give serious consideration to the views of this industry.

The Connecticut Nurserymen's Association was organized back in 1907. Its two top officers are from my district. Mr. W. Norman Leghorn, president of the association, is from Cromwell, Conn. Mr. Hendrik Verkade, Jr., the vice president, is from New London, Conn. The association's executive secretary, Mr. Charles Barr, is from West Haven, Conn.

The resolution reads as follows:

RESOLUTION

The members of the second legislative conference, sponsored by the American Association of Nurserymen, Inc., assembled in conference at the Hotel La Salle, Chicago, Ill., have viewed with alarm the proposed revision of quarantine 37.

"Whereas there are hundreds of potentially serious insect and disease pests resident in the United States; and

"Whereas the percentage of interceptions of potentially serious pests intercepted at ports of entry increases annually; and

"Whereas eradication of introduced pests is always expensive and frequently impossible; and

"Whereas there is no assurance that plant products frequently used as packing are pest free prior to processing and eventual use; and

"Whereas there could be no assurance that the shipments would not be contaminated en route from the site of origin either in foreign ports or aboard ship: Therefore be it

Resolved, That we, the undersigned, official representatives of the nursery industry of several States, oppose any change in quarantine 37, which would obviate

know, somehow becomes too secret to trust you with, too complex for you to understand, or too shocking for you to believe.

As an additional coverup for Khrushchev's motivation in his sudden shifts from test-ban killing to test-ban willing, sources close to the U.S. administration attempt to credit our great Cuban victory for his dramatic change. He is pictured as made "more cautious" by the "bold action" of U.S. leadership—as overawed by our "overwhelming nuclear superiority." Newsweek confides that "lessons learned from the Cuban crisis built up pressures within each nation's leadership for a test-ban agreement." Presidential Press Secretary Pierre Salinger officially informed the press that the Cuban crisis tensions had made a test ban "even more urgent."

Responding to this cue, Khrushchev hams it up in suspiciously sudden servile speeches: "The 'paper tiger' has nuclear teeth." "The United States has 40,000 atomic or nuclear warheads. . . . If one let all those bombs come down on humanity, 700 to 800 million people would perish. Countries would be wiped out."

In strange similarity to the U.S. administration's endorsement of the Communist big lie that they were introducing only defensive weapons into Cuba, Khrushchev now supports the massive myths inspired by sources close to the U.S. administration, purporting to give the answers to Khrushchev's dramatic about-face on nuclear test bans I and II.

According to privately expressed views of military experts and nuclear scientists, however, here are the real reasons for Khrushchev's change from contemptuous destroyer of test ban I in 1961 to ingratiating pitchman promoter of test ban II in 1962. Here are the suppressed facts and the significance of the undisclosed Soviet gains in nuclear technology which make the climatic difference between the strategic power balance in 1961 and in 1962.

In 1961, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons material was twice as big as Russia's. We had twice the number of nuclear warheads they did. Our warheads were more sophisticated than theirs across the entire spectrum of nuclear weaponry.

Most important of all, from the strategic viewpoint, our nuclear technology was far more advanced than theirs. From each pound of nuclear material in warheads, we could get twice the explosive power. That is, their yield-to-weight ratio was only half as good as ours.

Thus, in 1961, if Khrushchev had not carried out a massive and magnificently researched program of large-scale nuclear tests in the atmosphere, he would have frozen Soviet nuclear technology—and hence Soviet military power—in a position of vast inferiority.

Khrushchev, a dedicated Communist, would not do that to the Soviet Union. To him, any leaders who would fail to order nuclear tests to break their country out of a position of nuclear inferiority, would be "slobbering idiots."

From the beginning of test ban I, in October 1958, therefore, the Soviets conducted what President Kennedy has described as "prolonged secret preparations for a sudden series of major tests." In September 1961, Khrushchev—with more than 2 years of cynical premeditation—betrayed his triple-plighted promises of test ban I.

Those of our scientists who were not so naive as to believe that he would not cheat at all, expected only that he would attempt clandestine underground tests. These would equal at most the explosive force of a few thousand tons of TNT. Instead, he went straight to atmospheric tests of the force of scores of millions of tons. His biggest shot—amounting to 58 million tons of TNT

equivalent—made headlines around the world for weeks.

The most momentous news growing out of the Soviet test ban I violation, however, still has made no headlines whatever. On the basis of the influence it will have on the lives and liberty of nearly 190 million Americans, this news should have headlined every newspaper in the Nation: "Soviet Test ban Breaking Steals U.S. Strategic Superiority; Communists Now Far Ahead in Technology of Nuclear Superweapons."

Thus, in 1963, if Khrushchev traps us into test ban II, he will have completely reversed the 1961 situation. U.S. nuclear technology will be frozen in a position vastly inferior to that of the Soviets.

The specific basis for the headline above is that the Soviet test ban breaking series of September 1961, enabled them to improve their nuclear explosive yield-to-weight ratio up to 1,000 percent, in the strategic and superweapon categories.

From being able to get only half as much power as the United States did from each pound of nuclear material, they leapfrogged over us to obtain up to five times more yield per pound than we had in 1961.

The military significance of such a sensational gain in explosive efficiency is staggering. It's like acquiring—virtually without cost in potential nuclear explosive power priced, at U.S. standards, at some \$90 billion. It's like being able to add to a national arsenal of conventional explosives, additional tons of TNT sufficient to fill a string of boxcars stretching to the moon and back some 80 times.

Such figures are not, of course, necessarily meaningful—especially to us. That they have a deep meaning to Khrushchev was demonstrated by his Cuban missile adventure. He obviously is convinced this unprecedented bonanza of additional nuclear power will provide him with the overwhelming military might to conquer the world without undue risk of massive nuclear retaliation. His test-ban cheating gains have enabled him to adopt the grimmest of all nuclear strategies: The strategy of the "calculated win."

How can a tenfold increase in nuclear explosive efficiency so quickly revolutionize the military power which controls the world? The answer lies in the fact that nuclear materials in weapons stockpiles can be reworked in accordance with new techniques. The Soviets acquired, therefore, the immediate potential of multiplying the megatonnage of their stockpile by a factor of up to 10.

The most reliable nonofficial estimates of the Soviet stockpile put it at about 20 kilomegatons (20,000 million tons of TNT equivalent) in 1961. It is theoretically possible, therefore, that—without adding any new nuclear material other than to offset normal deterioration—they could rework the totality of their explosive power toward 200 kilomegatons.

The 1961 U.S. stockpile was unofficially estimated at 40 kilomegatons. It had taken us some 20 years and \$20 billion to build it up to that.

The Soviet's spectacular increase in explosive power per pound has some additional military effects even more significant than the capability of multiplying the totality of the explosive power of their nuclear stockpile. The second military asset derived from their test-ban cheating is in the multiplication they can now secure in the "numbers effect" or the "nuclear destructiveness" of their nuclear weaponry. A simplified formula for this is stated as follows: "A threefold increase in the explosive power per pound is the same as doubling the number of weapons."

Thus the Soviet's estimated number of weapons in 1961—some 10,000—would, with

the tenfold increase in explosive power per pound of nuclear material in the warheads, become the equivalent in "nuclear destructiveness" of 133,000 weapons of the low-power-per-pound warhead type they had fore they trapped us in test ban I.

The republication of this formula, in this connection, should raise some shrill voices in elite circles in Washington. It can expose many deceptive half-truths being fed the public. For an outstanding example the "missile gap in reverse" myth is based entirely on numbers of missiles, and ignores completely the destructive power of missile warheads. Thus it is said, "We have 200 ICBM's. The Soviets have only 100 ICBM's. We have a 2 to 1 lead." The implication is that our missile force is also twice as powerful. But what about the warheads?

Our newest and soon to be most numerous missile, Minuteman, has a warhead of about one-half of 1 megaton now. Assume we can double it to 1 megaton. The Soviets—with their test ban gained greater yield-to-weight ratio, and much more powerful rocket thrust, undoubtedly have operational missiles of 30 megatons. Applying the destructiveness formula, the 100 Soviet missiles could equal not merely 200 U.S. Minuteman missiles—but 2,000 of them. So, the "missile gap in reverse" can be reversed again.

The Soviets most probably do not have 100 30-megaton missiles—yet. They now have, however, the capability of producing that many very fast. This is because of the third great military advantage they secured from their nuclear test series which destroyed test ban I. They can now package a 30-megaton warhead in a smaller casing, having less weight, than that of their old 5 megaton warheads. Warheads of the same power as carried by their pre-1961 rockets can be packaged in incredibly smaller and lighter casings.

This simplifies and reduces the cost of the rocket vehicles necessary to carry them. The missiles can be much smaller, need less rocket thrust and fuel, and less complex guidance systems. As the missiles get lighter and smaller, it is increasingly easier to move them about and conceal them, and less expensive to protect them with concrete and steel silos. This raises the possibility of Soviet development of the so-called bantam missiles—small in size, easy to hide, but powerful of warhead. Persistent reports place numbers of these bantams in Cuba now—along with the known presence of leading Soviet missile experts.

The Soviets undoubtedly secured additional gains out of making and breaking test ban I. The above outline is derived from nonclassified sources, and is, of course incomplete. The specific gains described, however, are more than enough to demonstrate that the result of test ban I was a major military disaster for the United States.

Precisely because trusting the Soviets in test ban I did result in such a major military disaster to the United States, should not the first question concerning test ban II be this: "Is there any reasonable safeguard provided to protect the United States against the Soviets doing exactly the same thing they did in betraying our trust in test ban I?"

By a slick diversion, however, the entire attention of the American people and the Congress has been focused on the much publicized negotiations concerning safeguards against the type of cheating the Soviets did not engage in during test ban I. All of the many genuine concessions made openly by the United States and all the magnanimous phoneys made by the Soviets, relate to inspection to detect minor cheating—low-powered clandestine underground shots.

What we should have learned from test ban I, is that when Khrushchev cheats, he

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of closing ports in the United States so that U.S. goods would not be shipped in any vessel that trades with Cuba. However, the American Maritime Association has just stated that the shipping orders that the Government issued to date are weak and inadequate and that they will not stop non-Soviet vessels from trading with Cuba. I want to urge that our Government take a firm policy in closing our ports to any ship sailing under the flag of any nation which allows its ships to trade with Cuba, that we urge strong action by the Organization of American States to close all ports in this hemisphere to the ships of any nation trading with Cuba. Less talk of conflicting arms reports and more action of a positive nature is what the American people want.

DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR TESTING

Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, Dr. Stefan T. Possony is director of the international political studies program of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. He has devoted a lifetime to study of international power relationships with particular reference to U.S. strategy and tactics in relation to the threats of communism. His views on nuclear testing, submitted to the Republican conference committee on that subject are the following:

THE URGENCY OF SERIOUS TESTING (By Dr. Stefan T. Possony)

In 1961, N. S. Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union, announced that the Soviet military forces would be equipped with nuclear arms possessing a firepower of 100 megatons. Since the Soviets place highest reliance on missiles, this announcement is to be interpreted to mean that, in addition to superbombs, the Soviets are working on missile warheads which could develop 50 to 100 megaton yields.

Accordingly, the Soviets must make enormous improvements in their nuclear efficiency. They have, in fact, conducted a substantial number of high yield tests during 1961 and 1962. Whether or not their objective will be reached, they have demonstrated a strong intent to center their military power squarely on superyield weapons.

After the completion of their 1962 series, the Soviets need time to digest the new information. It is to their interest if during such a period of apparent standstill, the United States were prevented from testing. Hence the Soviets went through the motions of offering a few ostensible "concessions" in the test ban negotiation. Yet after showing his friendly face, in two letters to President Kennedy, the dialectic Khrushchev addressed the world Communist movement and showed his real face. He told the comrades in Berlin, on January 16, 1963, that the strategy of peaceful coexistence would lead to the emergence of revolutionary situations and that suitable opportunities must be utilized by the Communists to seize power. He intimated that the Communists would resort to armed struggle and not shy away from using the "most decisive weapons" if this were necessary "in the interest of the victory of socialism."

In spite of this confirmation that the Soviet intention to destroy the United States and to conquer the world has not changed

by one iota, and in spite of the fact that Khrushchev "conceded" only the shadow of an unworkable inspection system, President Kennedy suspended American testing. Thereupon the Soviets committed the tactical error of reverting to their customary delaying tactics. President Kennedy, to his credit, reversed himself and within a week ordered the resumption of testing.

Clearly, to risk a second unpolluted test moratorium, be it only for a few weeks, was a mistake which, after about 5 years of experiences with the test ban negotiation, should have been avoided. Although the mistake was repaired speedily, the fundamental policy assumptions and objectives which caused this dangerous action to be taken in the first place, are continuing to operate and to influence governmental decisions.

These assumptions include the notion that a test ban would be in the strategic interests of the United States and its allies; that a mutually supervised and controlled test ban is technically feasible; and that the Soviet Union is seriously interested in obtaining a genuine test ban treaty instead of using test ban propaganda for the purpose of slowing down American nuclear progress. These assumptions specifically do not include a realization that through the test ban negotiation, the Soviets are setting a trap and by means of stratagems and deceptions are attempting to disarm the United States unilaterally.

During the past few years, American nuclear programs have not been pushed with the vigor required to keep ahead of the threat of nuclear aggression, nor even to keep pace with rapidly advancing technology. We have failed to test in such a manner that the United States could reap the maximum security and industrial benefits from the revolutionary technology it pioneered. We do not need now the resumption of a desultory, slightly shadowy test program.

The time is long overdue when we must initiate a most serious and far-reaching test program in all environments, using all useful magnitudes of yield. We must test not only to make up for lost time but above all, to gain time in our race against aggression.

We cannot afford to be beaten in the contest for higher nuclear efficiencies. We cannot afford to allow the Soviets to pull ahead in the yield of their major weapon systems. We cannot afford, for example, to announce in 1962 a counterforce strategy and to admit in 1963 that our yields are inadequate to destroy hardened Soviet missile sites. We certainly cannot afford not to push most vigorously potential new technologies like neutron devices. And we had better get serious about Plowshare.

Our confused nuclear policy which is vainly trying to put the clock of history back, has been a key factor in bringing the NATO alliance to the brink of breakdown. The United States needs most urgently a new, forward looking and progressive nuclear policy which would put an end to three evils: technological slowdown within the United States, nuclear isolationism toward our allies, and vulnerability to being deceived and trapped by our enemies. Our Nation and our institutions will survive only as long as we possess a nuclear arsenal second to none.

CHESTER C. WARD'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR TESTING

Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, Chester C. Ward is a widely respected authority on international law and geopolitics. For a number of years he was a professor

of law at Georgetown University. As rear admiral, U.S. Navy, he served a tour of duty as Judge Advocate General of the Navy. In submitting his paper to the GOP conference committee on nuclear testing, he stressed that yield-to-weight figures, megatonnage of nuclear stockpiles, and similar data in the paper are order of magnitude assumptions for comparative purposes which are to be regarded as unofficially estimated ratios and in no way as assertions of fact. It is to be noted that Premier Khrushchev recently publicized Soviet estimates of U.S. nuclear potentials.

The Ward paper reads as follows:

THE CONCEALED RESULT OF TEST BAN I—THE CONCEALED PURPOSE OF TEST BAN II—SOVIETS' SUPREMACY IN STRATEGIC SUPER-WEAPONS

(By Chester C. Ward)

"We would be slobbering idiots if we did not carry out nuclear tests."—Nikita S. Khrushchev, Time, December 15, 1961.

"The time has come now to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests."—Nikita S. Khrushchev, letter to President Kennedy, dated December 19, 1962.

What changed Khrushchev from the arrogant and contemptuous destroyer of test ban I, in 1961, to the ardent apostle of test ban II in 1962?

What really happened between 1961 and 1963 to the balance of nuclear power between the Soviet Union and the United States? Why are the results of the Soviet first test-ban-breaking test series being suppressed? Why are the results of the Soviet second series being ignored? Why are deals being made, concessions offered, secret sessions held, U.S. underground tests halted? What is the relationship of the Cuban crisis to highest level pressures to rush into test ban II before the public and Congress discover the gains made by the Soviets by test ban I?

Are test ban II negotiations serving to cover the unilateral de facto disarmament of the United States?

The press does not ask these questions—let alone answer them. Military experts—who know the answers—are muzzled. Nuclear scientists—who are largely responsible for the answers—are silent.

The public simply doesn't give a damn. They continue to wallow in what Gen. Thomas D. White, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, characterizes in extreme litotes as the "great national orgy of self-congratulation"—inspired by distorted interpretation of the meaning of the Cuban crisis.

It's too bad the American people aren't interested in these nuclear test-ban answers. For just this one time, individuals would not be helpless to do something to avert the most imminent Communist trap. All they would have to do is insist on answers to these questions.

At the least, these answers would reveal—if we end up cinders or slaves, dead or Red—how Khrushchev got the overwhelming supremacy of strategic military power necessary to do it to us. If, at the time of Khrushchev's next Cuban-type missile threat, his weapons turn out to be so fantastically more powerful than ours, that our choice is narrowed to surrender or suicide—here in these answers is how his weapons—and ours—got that way.

These answers aren't easy to get, of course. Nor are they easy to understand. If they were, you would have had them long before now. This is no coincidence—but it does result from the coincidence that both Khrushchev and the U.S. administration want test ban II to go through.

Triple curtains of classification, complexity, and credibility shroud the real answers. Everything the American people need to

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Much of his most important work is developed in this way.

The ombudsman may inquire into substance, procedure, legality, delay, convenience, and even politeness. His criticisms go to all questions of good administration. What is good administration depends not merely upon statutes, regulations, precedents, and customs, but also upon the ombudsman's opinion. Indeed, one of the most vital elements of the system may lie in the ombudsman's creativeness. He studies problems of administration imaginatively. Just as courts build bodies of judge-made law, the accumulated criticisms and recommendations made by the ombudsman become an authoritative body of ombudsman-made law. A criticism of one administrator is likely to be known by and heeded by another administrator.

The ombudsman has no power to change any administrative action. His only powers are to investigate, criticize, recommend, and publicize. His power rests heavily on his individual prestige. Widespread public knowledge of his function is probably essential.

Prestige plus publicity may provide a powerful sanction. The Danish press seems eager for any statement the ombudsman cares to release and the public seems interested in what he says. Of course, he does not publicize all he does; some of his most important recommendations are made without publicity. He reports annually to Parliament and he often recommends legislation.

In the Scandinavian countries much attention has been given to the problem of whether an ombudsman should deal not only with procedure but also with matters of substance and matters of discretion, and the general opinion has been that he should. Although the Danish ombudsman estimates that fewer than one-half of 1 percent of the recommendations he makes have to do with abuse of substantive discretion, the belief is that the threat of the possibility of criticism of substance in any case has a pervasive and desirable effect upon administrators and civil servants. The Norwegian Parliament, after long controversy, decided in 1962 to empower the ombudsman to criticize administrative action which is clearly unreasonable. And the powers of the Danish ombudsman were expanded by 1961 legislation to include local government as well as the national government—a further expression of confidence in the system.

Yet the Danish system clearly cannot be and should not be transplanted to Washington. We rely more than the Danes do on judicial review to keep administrators within their statutory jurisdiction. We also rely more than they do on procedural safeguards to assure fairness, and we use the judiciary to enforce the safeguards. The idea is an attractive one that an official critic of administrative action might deal with substance as well as procedure in those large areas of governmental action which are protected by neither procedural safeguards nor judicial review. But another major difference is that political pressures are greater in Washington than in Copenhagen, and the pressures seep further into issues involving individual interests; individual Congressmen often help constituents in a way that is unknown to members of the Danish Parliament. For instance, the Danish ombudsman is unaware of a single instance of an effort by a Member of Parliament to influence the result of an investigation by the ombudsman.

What is needed, instead of an effort to transplant a foreign system to America, is the development of an indigenous American animal that will thrive in the unique political and governmental climate of Washington. The Office of Administrative Procedure should not deal with substantive complaints,

even if abuse of discretion or unreasonableness is asserted, because such complaints are better handled by the courts; if areas of unreviewability are too large—as they may well be—the proper cure is to make judicial review available. Similarly, the Office should not deal with issues about legality; the proper forum for that within our system is a court. And the Office should not be designed to help particular parties win particular cases; an Office that would be designed to do that would surely be caught up in political pressures, and whether it could maintain its integrity against such pressures would be at least questionable. The purpose of the Office should be to improve procedure, not to help parties win their cases. Therefore, the recommendations should always relate to future procedure.

To say that each recommendation should look to the future and that the purpose of the system should be to improve procedure and not to help particular parties win their cases is not the same as saying that particular parties will never be helped. Obviously, parties with continuing business before an agency may be helped in that they prefer the new procedure to the old procedure. Even a party who has only one case before an agency may in some circumstances inevitably be helped, because a procedural change which looks only to the future may still in some way be beneficial to his case. For instance, a party about to make an application to an agency asks the agency how a vague statutory term has been interpreted in other cases, for he must plan his application accordingly, and is told that the agency has not published the results of its interpretations, does not intend to do so, and sees no reason to disclose the results of other cases. (This is an actual case.) If the Office of Administrative Procedure were to recommend that in the future any applicant should be told what the agency has done in other cases, the particular applicant would be helped even though the procedural change would relate only to the future. Similarly, a party complaining about undue delay (which definitely should be considered a procedural deficiency) may get the benefit of recommendations for curing the delay. That recommendations about future procedure will thus sometimes help particular parties may cause occasional problems about pressures from representatives of parties who stand to gain, but if the focus is limited to problems of future procedure, the pressures are unlikely to be too great to withstand, for in the great bulk of the cases complainants will not be helped with respect to their particular cases. And, happily, operations of complete integrity are quite common in Washington, even when great interests are directly at stake.

The Office of Administrative Procedure clearly should not be bound to investigate all the complaints it receives. The statutory provision proposed by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1941 that the Director "shall" investigate complaints "which appear to be made in good faith" seems impracticable, no matter how well staffed the Office may be. The Director should have a discretionary power to pick and choose even among the complaints that seem to have merit.

The power to publicize adverse criticisms of particular administrative action is a drastic power which must be used sparingly and cautiously. It probably should be limited to cases in which the facts the Director asserts are undisputed or beyond doubt and to judgments about procedure that admit of no reasonable difference of opinion. An unwise use of this power can quickly destroy confidence in the Director and can even destroy the Office of Administrative Procedure. Yet a proper use of this power can be highly beneficial. Experience in other countries shows that the greatest benefits do not stem

from administrators' adoption of the recommendations; the good that is done flows from the knowledge of all bureaucrats, not merely the particular one who is criticized, that their behavior may be publicly criticized by an officer whose word the public respects.

The function of receiving and investigating complaints should interact with and supplement the function of the Office in making sustained studies of problems of administrative procedure and organization, but the standards in the performance of the two functions should normally be decidedly different. The Director's goal in making major studies, designed for recommending legislation or for recommending voluntary administrative changes-in-procedure patterns, may often be to replace the good with the excellent. And that may occasionally be the purpose of quiet recommendations that grow out of the investigation of complaints. But in making public criticisms of administrators, the Director should usually refrain from disapproving the good or even the barely tolerable. Adverse public criticisms of administrative action in particular cases should generally be limited to the poor, the very poor, and the intolerable.

The question for decision in the establishment of an Office of Administrative Procedure is not whether the Office may receive and investigate complaints. It would be unthinkable to have an Office whose concern is administrative procedure and to try to prevent that Office from receiving suggestions from the outside. Obviously, the Office must explore trouble spots irrespective of the source of information about them.

The question for decision is whether in establishing such an office, specific provision should be made for receiving and investigating complaints, and whether specific provision should be made as to what the office should not do concerning such complaints. The British Council on Tribunals is suffering from lack of explicit statutory answer to the question whether or not it may hold itself out as an authority to whom parties may complain.

I recommend that the Administrative Conference should propose legislation authorizing an Office of Administrative Procedure to receive and investigate complaints concerning administrative procedure, that the legislation should explicitly provide that the office has no power to investigate complaints relating to substance or legality, that the office should have discretionary power to refuse to investigate any particular complaint, and that the purpose of recommendations by the office should relate to future procedure and should not be primarily designed to help a particular party to prevail on any issue in any particular case.

Mr. Speaker, obviously, much more thought must be given to the ombudsman question before we can say with certainty that an adaptation of it to our American institutions makes sense. But surely the subject is one that should be considered now by people both in and out of government.

Among the tentative criteria for an American ombudsman, the following occur to me:

First. The ombudsman's duty should be to help Congressmen and their constituents in a variety of cases which are now the traditional subjects of congressional-constituent relations. Social security cases, Veterans' Administration cases, treatment and discharges in the military services, claims of discrimination in defense contracts, immigration disputes, come readily to mind as examples.

Second. Legislation setting up an ombudsman should make him the agent of

Congress, in much the same manner as the Comptroller General.

Third. The ombudsman's jurisdiction should not extend to matters now covered by the Comptroller General's jurisdiction—generally involving the legality of governmental expenditures.

Fourth. The ombudsman should in no way impair present congressional-constituent relationships. A constituent should probably deal with the Ombudsman only through his Congressman or Senator, not directly. The legislator should in each instance determine whether to refer the matter to the ombudsman or to handle it himself. If he does refer the matter to the ombudsman, and is not satisfied with the result, he may pursue the matter further on his own.

Fifth. The ombudsman could not only assist the private citizen, but might represent a net saving to the taxpayer. An office of the ombudsman near Capitol Hill could centralize and professionalize the handling of much casework now done in 335 congressional offices, at least for a great bulk of the present work. This could make unnecessary increases in congressional staffs which are otherwise clearly going to be necessary in the years to come.

The question of an American ombudsman is surely one that needs to be considered in connection with any proposals now in the wind for a new look at the organization and function of the Congress.

QUALITY STABILIZATION LEGISLATION

Mr. MADDEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, today the gentleman from Arkansas, Congressman ORIN HARRIS and I, together with other Members, are reintroducing the quality stabilization legislation.

There is today a chaotic condition in the marketing of brand name products that has resulted in consumer confusion, loss of public confidence, closing of businesses, and substantial damage to makers of leading trademarked products.

For these reasons I have joined with the gentleman from Arkansas, Representative HARRIS in introducing the quality stabilization bill. Joining in this introduction of identical bills will be many Members of Congress from both parties and from every section of the country.

This bipartisan bill made remarkable progress in the last session of Congress. It was given a favorable report by the House Commerce Committee and only days before adjournment of Congress it cleared the Rules Committee. It surely will go all the way this session of Congress.

The Quality Stabilization Act will give needed protection to the consumer, to the small retailer, to labor, and to honored brand name manufacturers. It will do this without adding a single penny or person to the cost of government, because no governmental agency is involved

in the administration or enforcement of it.

This act will be 100 percent optional. It will enable the trademark owner to deny use of his brand name when it is used deceptively or destructively. There is no compulsion upon the trademark owner to use the act, but if he elects to do so, his product must be in free and open competition with other products usable for the same general purpose.

No wholesaler or retailer will be obliged to buy or sell any goods marketed under the act. They will be free as always to pick and choose just which product they will handle.

The consumer also will enjoy full freedom of choice, accepting or rejecting all merchandise, choosing freely between all products whether branded or unbranded, stabilized or unstabilized under the act.

The assault upon our brand name system of distribution has resulted in the employment of cheaper and less-skilled labor. This legislation with its practical correction of a destructive and growing economic disorder will give manufacturers the incentive to build better products instead of cheaper products with poor labor.

From all segments of our economy and from all sections of the Nation, Members of Congress are being requested, in ever-increasing numbers to enact this anti-monopoly bill. More than 70 national trade associations have endorsed it and label it as essential legislation. Both the gentleman from Arkansas, Chairman HARRIS and I predict that Congress will agree and will speedily enact it.

QUALITY STABILIZATION BILL

Mr. TOLLEFSON. Mr. Speaker, this country needs the incentives toward excellence provided in the quality stabilization bill which I have introduced today. We need to counter the self-satisfaction of cheapness. We need a law that will encourage a manufacturer to build toward superiority of product.

A major reason for my support of the quality stabilization bill also stems from experience which I had in my own State of Washington while serving as a prosecuting attorney in my home county. I saw at firsthand the bad effects of loss-leader and cut-rate-sales methods. Such methods in the long run are harmful to the public.

This bill recognizes the property right of the manufacturer in his brand name. It affords protection to the ethical retailer from the unfair merchant. It safeguards the interest of the consumer.

RESIDUAL FUEL OIL

(Mr. PERKINS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Speaker, this Nation has attained the highest economic development in the world during the past century while the basic source of power has been coal. This source of fuel has always been available in adequate supply regardless of the problems created by

three great wars. The industry has been able to expand to meet the increased wartime needs, enabling our industrial plants to keep our country at peak strength. Our basic fuels have been coal and oil—with domestic and imported oil replacing coal in a number of fields and in the railroad industry in particular.

During the past 25 years, the importers of residual fuel oil, principally from Venezuela where American firms have used obsolescent equipment for refineries, thus creating an oversupply of residual fuel oil.

The increased importation of residual oil has become a major problem for the coal industry. Mandatory import quotas were based on the levels of 1957 which was 358,000 barrels per day. This import quota has been increased steadily until it has now reached a level of 507,000 barrels a day which is equivalent to some 40 million tons of coal annually.

This represents a decrease in the demand for coal of almost 10 percent of the annual production. The result has been disastrous for our coal producers and as a lifetime resident of a coal-producing area, I realize how serious this has become.

Recently the Select House Committee on Small Business through its Subcommittee No. 4 under the chairmanship of my good friend and colleague, TOM STEED, of Oklahoma, has made a detailed study of this problem. I hope every Member of this body can find time to study this report.

I recognize the fact that Venezuela is a friendly nation that deserves whatever assistance we can afford to offer but this assistance should not result in the destruction of our basic fuel industry—coal. The crippling of the coal industry has already damaged our defense potential and continued weakening of this basic source of fuel actually endangers our future defense effort.

I am always ready and anxious to help our friends but first we must consider ourselves and our future.

ACuba

TRADE WITH CUBA

(Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, surprising as it may seem, reports in the news this morning state that President Goulart of Brazil has told of his support for U.S. efforts to obtain the withdrawal of communism from this hemisphere. In the past Brazil has taken a recalcitrant attitude when faced with U.S. policy objectives. However, his support for the United States gives added weight to the statement made recently by President Facio of the Organization of American States in a speech delivered to the Pan American Union in Washington in which he stated that the United States must take the lead in championing freedom in this hemisphere; that the nations of Latin America are ready to follow the leadership of this Nation.

As this body knows, only this week the President announced a partial objective

of Wisconsin Rapids has reported passage of a resolution favoring legislation to regulate and curb the use of synthetic detergents. Many other localities are considering what steps they may take to deal with the problem.

But the problem is nationwide and a national solution is appropriate, especially since it will be less costly and more effective than local regulatory attempts.

The use of synthetic detergents—popularly called simply detergents even though technically soap is also a detergent—has come into its own since World War II. Since then, the amounts of detergent used have increased with the increases in self-service laundries and in the number of home washing machines. Last year, some 3.5 billion pounds of detergents valued at \$832 million were sold in this country, and the volume used is increasing at a rate of about 5 percent a year.

Unfortunately, the bulk of the detergents now being sold have as their main ingredient a chemical known as ABS, alkyl benzene sulphonate. ABS is a cheap, plentiful byproduct of petroleum refining. It was first produced during World War I by the Germans who had been cut off from the supplies of animal and vegetable fats needed for soap production by the Allied naval blockade. Detergents made with ABS have superior cleaning powers and can be produced in any of the multitudinous forms required for household and commercial uses. They match the performance of soap in soft water and far surpass the old natural cleansers in hard water. They are no more irritating than soap to sensitive skin. They are so good in fact that they largely sold themselves to the American consumers.

But when they have done their job of cleaning and are discharged into bodies of water or into septic tanks, they become a real and growing problem. Detergents with ABS are highly resistant to the natural decomposition and to man's sewage treatment processes. Although some detergent pollution is removed by secondary sewage treatment plants, much remains in the water.

"USED" WATER USED MORE

Thus the level of detergent pollution is building up in the water that we use. Research on how to remove ABS has so far failed to discover any way of removing it economically. At the same time the reuse of water is increasing. As population becomes more concentrated in great metropolitan centers, water frequently is purified, used, discharged as waste water, repurified, reused and discharged again. At present 40 percent of the population drinks "used" water.

Well, what is the harm of this? No one, it is said, has died of detergent pollution. In fact rather large doses given to test animals over periods of 2 years or less have shown no evidence of poisoning. But other scientists believe that the continued intake of even small amounts of ABS cannot help but be harmful to health. Moreover, West German scientists have reported finding signs that detergents may be linked to cancer.

My husband, who is a physician, and I are very much concerned over the possible harmful effects of the prodigious use of detergents in our country—

Mrs. Albert H. Aldridge, of 14 East 19th Street, New York City, wrote.

You are doing all of us and all of our children a wonderful kindness introducing a bill to ban the use of detergents. This should take effect as soon as possible—sooner than 1965—because by then we will have all our fresh, clean water so polluted that we will be ill from the effect—

Writes Mrs. Herbert Rieskol, of 11380 Glennon Drive, Denver.

No one knows surely the degree of risk that we may run. But we dare not ignore the danger, particularly when reasonable action can avoid it.

Furthermore, there are many other reasons which support discontinuation of the use of synthetic detergents which do not decompose readily after use. Detergent concentrations at certain levels cause foaming and the creation of suds. When these bubbles turn up in drinking water, people are rightly distressed. Water should be appetizing in appearance and should not be laced with brand X detergent.

FOAM IN THE DRINKING WATER

In homes using detergents and served by a septic tank and well, we have experienced water so foamy and bad tasting that it is impossible to drink it. In cities where thousands are using detergents, it is only a question of time before the city reservoirs become polluted by these suds—

Said Mr. and Mrs. J. M. Norton, of Post Office Box 241, Utica, N.Y.

Although it would not be necessary, numerous housewives have expressed their willingness to do without detergents to protect the water supply.

As a housewife, I enjoy using detergents but would gladly give them up, and urge my neighbors to do likewise if it will help prevent this contamination of our water supplies—

Catherine Bujold, of 4925 54th Avenue, Minneapolis, wrote.

Although the underground water supplies at the far end of Long Island do not yet give evidence of pollution from detergents, that is only because the area is not yet thickly enough settled. Farther west on the island serious trouble is already being experienced—

Said Paul W. McQuillen, of Montauk Point, Long Island. As he said, there has been trouble elsewhere on the island. In fact, residents last year were forced to use bottled water to avoid drinking a half-and-half mixture of water and suds.

The foaming of detergent-laden water also detracts from the nation's scenery by marring beautiful rivers and streams.

What a horrible disgrace to allow these chemicals to ruin this water for downstream irrigation. More power to you—

Said a letter from 12 engineers living in Denver.

In my work as a sanitary engineer—

Edwin E. Crawford, of 6012 Tahoe Way, Sacramento, Calif., wrote—
I have seen rafts of suds floating down rivers

and a head of suds appearing on the surface of ground water samples. What toxic effect, if any, this petroleum derivative has on wildlife, man and his environs is presently a moot question. However, I am certain that the ingestion of detergent does not produce any benefit upon the recipient.

Detergents interfere with sewage disposal by causing difficulties in coagulation and sedimentation of the sewage and by keeping oxygen from reaching the contaminants. Billows of suds have even prevented plant employees from seeing what they were doing

DETERGENT POLLUTION HARMS FISH

In addition there is clear evidence that not uncommon levels of detergent pollution are harmful to fish. A report by a member of the Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineer Center of the Public Health Service states that synthetic detergents are 40 times more toxic to fish in hard water than soap. And most surface waters are moderately hard, the report notes. Other studies indicate that fish flee toxic substances when they accumulate gradually. One of the first signs of high detergent pollution is likely to be the relative absence of fish in their usual areas.

This letter is just to wish you luck in your upcoming detergent bill. Here in Williamsville, a suburb of Buffalo, N.Y., the detergent situation is getting very troublesome. The fishing in Lake Erie has declined to a very sad state and the lake in general is in sadder shape. The water in other waterways like the barge canal is made the worse because of the detergents—

Reported John R. Lutgen, of 9150 Ayer Road, Williamsville, N.Y.

In the Great Lakes area, especially, where water is one of our greatest assets, we can't afford to let this type of pollution go unchecked much longer. As a fisherman, I, and probably a lot of others, are wondering what next? The consequences to man and wildlife could be pretty grim—

Jim Carter, of 325 Fuller Avenue SE., Grand Rapids, Mich., wrote to me.

SWITCH TO DECOMPOSABLE DETERGENT

Mr. Speaker, I want again to emphasize that my bill would not require a reversion to soap as the principal cleansing agent used in American households. This could not be justified economically or in terms of the inconvenience to housewives it would cause. My bill would only require manufacturers to market a type of detergent that does decompose after use which has already been developed in Western Germany. This type of detergent is somewhat more expensive than the type now in use and this, naturally, has deterred producers from switching to it. Obviously, the first to do so would be placed at a price disadvantage. Under my bill, all would be required to convert by the same time. Furthermore, the setting of a deadline for conversion to the new type of detergent would spur research to lower its price. Detergent that decomposes after use cleans just as well as the perpetually foaming variety.

This plan is patterned after one adopted in Western Germany where the problems from synthetic detergents contain-

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major importance, of great danger to us but I don't believe that we were under any greater threat from the Soviet Union's power taken in its totality after this than we were before. It was simply an element of flexibility introduced into the power equation that Soviets had not heretofore possessed.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, a private British study this week estimated that the United States has six times as many intercontinental missiles as the Soviet has. Does that sound about right to you?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I couldn't comment on the arithmetic. As I said before, we have a margin of superiority which we think is ample to allow for the fact that we do not posture our strategy on the surprise attack and therefore we have to always have, in my judgment at least, always should have to have, a real margin of strength in the strategic delivery area.

Mr. SCALL. Mr. Gilpatrick, you were the first administration spokesman to lay down the thesis that even if the Soviets were to try a sneak nuclear attack against us, we would not only survive it, but would have enough to virtually wipe out the Soviet Union in a retaliatory blow.

Is this still true, and do you think that this could have been a factor in Premier Khrushchev's decision to pull out the missiles from Cuba?

Mr. GILPATRICK. It seems to me from the Soviet actions that they accept, as we should, that either one of these great powers can deliver upon the other a thermonuclear blow of such proportions as to make that possibility unacceptable to any rational national leader. I think he realizes that. I think his statements both publicly and some of those which perhaps have not been published indicate a realization on his part of the dangers of setting in train any sort of a series of military actions which could scale up to a point where one side or the other would feel it necessary to use the full measure of its nuclear power. But I think our margin is sufficient and I think our national policy will continue to be as it has been now in our long-range planning. Of Mr. McNamara's 5-year force program, it is founded on the basic cardinal premise that we must keep that margin at all times no matter what the Soviets do.

Mr. SCALL. Mr. Secretary, we are about to close down the American missile base in England. Is it possible that we might consider or might close down the American missile base in Turkey and/or in Italy—not because the Soviets demand it as part of any deal, but because the missiles there might be getting obsolescent?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We don't contemplate closing down any of our foreign bases or overseas bases. The removal of the Thor in the case of the United Kingdom base is a matter of substituting one type of weapon for another. The British, the United Kingdom Valiant bomber force will be able to cover the targets that are assigned to the United Kingdom forces—they and other externally applied strategic weapons—to a point where the removal of the Thors, the phasing out of the Thors will not again affect the total military equation.

But I don't believe that we are going to change our present strategy of having many points from which we can defend ourselves if need be with nuclear weapons.

Mr. CLARK. You are saying our missile bases in Turkey are still a valuable part of our missile defense, even though we have adequate Polaris and ICBMs?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I consider all the bases we have today as important to us. Now that doesn't mean that there will not come times when we won't modernize our weapons in different areas, where we won't substitute, have different combinations of forces, but as of now, our whole NATO base structure is the foundation of our planning both as a—

as our national forces and the NATO forces and therefore we have no thought of giving up any of our overseas bases.

Mr. CLARK. Do you anticipate that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey might be replaced by a more modern type of missile?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I am not in a position to say what will be done with the Jupiters. The Jupiters today are assigned targets which are part of the responsibility of the military to take out in the case of a strike. If there are other means at some stage of taking care of those same targets, we may make some different distribution or deployment, but as of now, we need all the weapons we have deployed.

Mr. SCALL. Mr. Secretary, both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev in their exchange of letters said that the Cuban crisis demonstrates anew the urgent need for some kind of trustworthy disarmament. Do we have any new proposals in this connection which we might offer?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I do not know of any new proposals which have been generated out of this particular experience. After all we are not even out of this one yet. However, our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the other elements in government which work on this whole question of arms control are constantly considering how we can move on toward the goal that we have as a national objective, which at some stage—it may not seem very realizable in the immediate future—of general disarmament. And doubtless in connection with forthcoming disarmament sessions, we will be reviewing our proposals and there may be some variations in what we have heretofore put on the table with the Soviets.

Mr. SCALL. What have we learned about our ability to deploy forces and weapons as a result of the Cuban crisis?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We have relearned a lesson that we must never forget in this time in history and that is the importance of quick reaction, the ability of moving fast and not having the kind of delays for example that took place when we moved forces into Lebanon a number of years ago, or that the British and the French encountered in the Suez experience. We are in a far better position today than we ever were, and I think this Cuban experience shows it, to organize and dispose of our forces in very fast fashion.

Mr. SCALL. Were you generally satisfied with the speed of our buildup and our movement of forces?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We are never satisfied, because we never do it completely right. We learned a number of lessons from which we will profit. You try to look at the bright side of these things as well as the somber side and I think the military command would agree with me that we have learned a lot from this exercise that we will now grind into our procedures, and I feel that our forces did a splendid job, all of them. Of course the principal burden fell upon the Navy, plus the technical command of the Air Force, but the preparations that were laid are general worldwide alert. The movement of our forces to be in a position if need be to take stronger military action was done in a way that gave us all a good deal of satisfaction.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, we want to get your views on the seriousness of the fighting between India and Red China. Do you think we might eventually have to supply troops as well as arms to India?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I am not qualified to discuss that issue as fully as others might be. I have been pretty well preoccupied this past week with what is happening down in the Caribbean. But you must remember in the context of your question that the Indians have a very large and well-trained army with strong traditions from the earlier days of their association with the British and I be-

lieve they will be able to render a pretty good account of themselves if they are pressed further by the Chinese Communists.

Mr. SCALL. For example, sir, do you think perhaps we might need more jet transports to help transport weapons faster to places like India?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We have a major buildup going on in our airlift program as a part of the budget last year and our forthcoming budget which will be presented to Congress the first of the year. We will continue to provide increasing numbers of long-range aircraft for carriage both of soldiers, forces, and people, as well as of equipment. It is a very important factor in this quick reaction that I spoke of.

Mr. CLARK. One quick final question: How about that defense budget that is going to Congress next year, is it going to be bigger than this year?

Mr. GILPATRICK. It will not be any less, but I don't think the Cuban crisis as such has changed the requirements upwards. I think we've got a long time ahead when we are going to have to maintain a large military establishment for the protection of this country.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, our time is just about up.

Thank you very much, Secretary Gilpatrick, for being with us today on "Issues and Answers."

The ANNOUNCER. This has been another in ABC's newsmaking series which brings you the answers to the issues of today.

Next week at this same time our guest will be Congressman-elect ROBERT TART, Jr., Republican from Ohio. We hope that you will be with us.

THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION TO PREVENT WATER POLLUTION BY SYNTHETIC DETERGENTS

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, every passing day provides added evidence of the need for passage of H.R. 2105, which I introduced last January 17. The bill will bar from interstate commerce, after June 30, 1965, all surface-active detergents which do not meet standards of decomposability to be set by the Surgeon General of the United States.

Since the introduction of the bill I have received countless letters from municipal officials, sanitary and hydraulic engineers, conservationists, sportsmen and citizens aggrieved by the growing detergent pollution of our rivers and streams and of ground water. These letters have come from every part of the Nation and have been virtually unanimous in their plea for action in the direction I have proposed to protect our vital water supply. Only last week it was reported in the Washington Evening Star that detergent pollution had occurred in two deep water wells at the Beltsville, Md., Agricultural Research Center of the Department of Agriculture.

LOCALITIES FAVOR ANTIDETERGENT ACTION

In a letter to me, Mayor Philip J. Bailey, of Ottawa, Ill., has described detergent pollution as "an extremely serious matter to the municipalities."

I compliment you for your action and I offer any assistance that I may render to your cause—

He wrote.

George P. Smith, a member of the Cuyahoga River Reclamation Commission in Ohio, declared that the "crusade against water pollution must continue. It could mean our civilization." The city

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the technicians who are associated with the weapons that are being removed, the MRBM's are probably en route back to Russia along with those weapons. Now how many "technicians" remain in Cuba in connection with the IL-28 bombers or with the surface-to-air missiles or with the other equipment which has been furnished for the military in Cuba by the Soviets, it is impossible for us to tell as of now.

Mr. CLARK. How about those 70 Soviet Mig fighters that are still in Cuba, are we worried about those?

Mr. GILPATRICK. The Mig fighters are primarily interceptors. That is they are used in the defensive role. They have a range, of course, that could carry them across the Florida straits and over the mainland of the United States. Indeed they could reach other parts of the Caribbean area, but they are designed primarily as our fighters are of similar nature, as air defense fighters so we have not classified them as weapons which we regard as offensive.

Mr. SCALLI. They could be used, couldn't they, though, to deliver nuclear bombs if they were converted to longer-range, fuel tanks and so on?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I haven't examined the characteristics of the Mig's. Only a few of them, only a portion of the total number of Mig's are the high performance. There are Mig-17's and 19's as well as Mig-21's. It might be that these Mig's could be used for nuclear weapons delivery although that has not happened before to my knowledge.

Mr. SCALLI. Well, Mr. Secretary, how about the antiaircraft missiles and the missile sites, do we continue to classify them as defensive weapons and thereby conclude that the Soviets don't have to remove these at the present time?

Mr. GILPATRICK. The characteristics of the surface-to-air missiles which have been installed in Cuba by the Soviets is such that their cone of fire, their range, their general utilization is such that we don't consider them a threat to the United States or to other Latin American countries. Obviously they facilitate the use of offensive weapons, so it would depend on what weapons Cuba was left with to know how valuable those surface-to-air missiles are to the Cubans or how much danger they pose for us.

Mr. SCALLI. Some Republican critics claim that the President's agreement with Mr. Khrushchev guarantees a sanctuary for communism in the Western Hemisphere which will not be invaded. What do you say to criticism of that kind?

Mr. GILPATRICK. Well, as I said earlier, our covenants, the U.S. Government's pledges regarding invasion of Cuba do not come into play until the commitments on the Soviet's part have been fulfilled so as of now we don't have any obligation that is extant, because the Soviet performance has only been partial.

Assuming for the moment that the Soviet performance is complete, which may be a very large assumption and therefore that our pledge about invasion does come into play, it may not fundamentally change the status quo ante because under the Rio Pact and under our own national policy we have never had an objective of invading Cuba. We have an objective of maintaining peace in the Caribbean, of protecting the United States and honoring our treaty obligations under both the U.N. Charter and the Rio Pact.

Mr. CLARK. I think you would agree, though, that we were pretty close to a decision on possible invasion of Cuba at one point, weren't we?

Mr. GILPATRICK. It was one of the courses of action that obviously came up for consideration if the Soviets had not backed down and removed at least the most threatening of the offensive weapons that we found there had been introduced surreptitiously

and by deceitful means prior to the 14th of October.

Mr. CLARK. And it is a course of action which will now be closed to us if the Soviets do carry out their pledge to remove all offensive weapons?

Mr. GILPATRICK. The Castro problem we had before the Soviets decided to establish a major military base in Cuba and we will have the problem after the Soviets' base is removed.

Mr. SCALLI. Mr. Secretary, some persons have said that the administration was just late in waking up to the fact that these missiles were there, that actually they were there far longer than our intelligence had reason to believe. Do you accept this?

Mr. GILPATRICK. No, because I feel we have had access to the most effective intelligence means that have yet been developed, to my knowledge at least. We acted immediately upon the receipt of intelligence that the missile bases were installed. There was a great deal of concealment, a great deal of secrecy about the introduction of these weapons. The actual preparing of the sites and the placement on them of these weapons took place very quickly and I believe that we acted as quickly as we could.

Now as bearing on that it is most important to remember that for our allies to stand with us as they did so effectively in the OAS, as well as the support which we have since received from our other allies in NATO and elsewhere throughout the world, we had to have a hard case. We had to have good evidence of this threat and without the kind of photography which our surveillance planes came through with, beginning with the 14th of October, I doubt that we would have had this support and that we could have been as effective in our policies.

Mr. SCALLI. How long do you think, Mr. Secretary, these medium-range missiles were in Cuba before we spotted them?

Mr. GILPATRICK. Well, all I know is our photography at the end of August, as the President has pointed out, did not disclose any of these missiles and therefore our assumption is that sometime between the end of August and the 14th of October they were brought in or at least they were brought out into the open in the erection process and the placement of the missiles on the sites where we first observed them.

Mr. CLARK. Of course those first pictures which were made public by the Pentagon which were taken, I believe, on October 14 showed that these bases were almost completed. Now doesn't this indicate there was a lag in our aerial survey, that there was a period of perhaps a couple of weeks where our aerial inspection was inadequate?

Mr. GILPATRICK. The first pictures, as I recall, at San Cristóbal were of only one or two sites, one of which was only partly completed, and only had part of the equipment on it.

Now we subsequently through the extension of our surveillance during the week after the 14th did pick up additional sites. How fast those were brought in, how much before construction was underway and during a period I might say when our surveillance was hampered by bad weather, I don't think we will ever know exactly the exact sequence of events during those 6 weeks from the end of August until the middle of October.

Mr. SCALLI. Mr. Secretary, is it possible that the rapidity with which we did spot these medium range missiles stopped the Soviets in midsea from bringing their longer range missiles into Cuba?

Mr. GILPATRICK. That is another enigma we may never have the answer to. We do know that after our limited quarantine was imposed beginning following the President's statement on the 22d of October, a number of Russian ships turned back, including at least two ships that had large hatches and

holds sufficient to accommodate missiles, so we assume—in fact I believe there were further missiles on there way over when we announced our decision to apply the quarantine measure.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, much has been said about the threat of nuclear war that hung over the world during this period. Do you think we were ever at the brink of war with the Soviets?

Mr. GILPATRICK. Here was a situation where the two great thermonuclear powers of the world were in direct confrontation over a major issue, something that, as the President pointed out in his statement of October 22, was a new departure from any move the Soviets had made before. They had never attempted to bring as close to the shores of the United States the existence of their strategic weapons. Obviously under those circumstances, very grave consequences could have ensued had not the Soviets backed down.

Mr. CLARK. What do you think Khrushchev's real motive was in trying to establish these missile bases in Cuba?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I can't read his mind and I have never heard any single explanation which would answer all the questions that might occur to any of us in analyzing his motives. Obviously he was, I think, trying to present us with a heightened threat for some purpose, whether to enhance his bargaining position over Berlin or in some other of the numerous confrontations we have with the Sino-Soviet bloc throughout the world. We have to view the threat of communism in its totality. We have to regard it as an indivisible affair. We have to make all our policy decisions in the light of reactions and counterreactions and how the Soviet moves in this particular instance related to other plans they had I couldn't say and may never know.

Mr. SCALLI. Do you think that perhaps Mr. Khrushchev might have decided on this very chancey maneuver because he realized that compared to the United States the Soviet Union is weak in its ability to deliver nuclear warheads, on target?

Mr. GILPATRICK. I do not regard the Soviets as considering themselves weak. We do feel we have, as we have stated several times during the past 12 to 18 months, a measurable margin of superiority in strategic weapons. Khrushchev, we think, knows that and while our intelligence is not precise enough to put a pair of calipers on the margin of the superiority we enjoy, it may be such as to lead him to think that he had to improve his strategic posture but in my own mind the military equation was not altered, the military equation between the Soviets and the United States, by the bringing closer to our shores of these missiles that previously had been ranged against us, or longer range missiles of the same weapon-carrying capacity at longer range. After all, the Soviets have missile-bearing submarines. Those submarines can reach our shores and warheads comparable to those that would have been borne by these missiles could be struck from submarines off our shore. So that I don't believe there was any major change in the overall military equation as a result of this particular deployment.

Mr. CLARK. Do you think then that we have over emphasized the danger of these medium range missile bases in Cuba?

Mr. GILPATRICK. Not at all. I think the presence of the missiles there, in this context of this being the first time the Soviets had ever put any such weapons outside their own immediate territory and in a situation where they might not always be able to control them, where you had a much shorter warning period and where the effect on the Latin American countries as well as on ourselves in the Western Hemisphere was very destabilizing—it changed the juxtaposition of these arrays of power, so I think it was of

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Mr. BUNDY. Well, I don't myself think that there is any present—I know there is no present evidence, and I think there is no present likelihood that the Cubans and the Cuban Government and the Soviet Government would in combination attempt to install a major offensive capability.

Now it is true that these words "offensive" and "defensive," if you try to apply them precisely to every single item, misleads you. Whether a gun is offensive or defensive depends a little bit on which end you are on. It is also true that the Mig fighters which have been put in Cuba for more than a year now, and any possible additions in the form of aircraft might have a certain marginal capability for moving against the United States, but I think we have to bear in mind the relative magnitudes here. The United States is not going to be placed in any position of major danger to its own security by Cuba, and we are not going to permit that situation to develop. That, I think, is what the administration has been trying to make clear.

So far, everything that has been delivered in Cuba falls within the categories of aid which the Soviet Union has provided, for example, to neutral states like Egypt, or Indonesia, and I should not be surprised to see additional military assistance of that sort. That is not going to turn an island of 6 million people with 5,000 or 6,000 Soviet technicians and specialists into a major threat to the United States, and I believe most of the American people do not share the views of the few who have acted as if suddenly this kind of military support created a mortal threat to us. It does not.

Mr. SCALI. Mr. Bundy, how about Senator KEATING's claim that these antiaircraft missiles which are being provided to the Cubans right now could be converted with some little adjustment into ground-to-ground missiles with a range of up to 1,400 miles?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, if that is what Senator KEATING said—and I am not in a position of having seen exactly what he said, but anyone who said that is saying something which just does not correspond with the situation. That is just wrong.

Mr. SCALI. These missiles cannot be converted?

Mr. BUNDY. The missiles of the kind which we have identified up to this point are certainly not susceptible to this kind of conversion or translation. It is as if you were to try to turn a destroyer into an antiaircraft carrier by waving a wand.

Mr. SCALI. In that connection, sir, there has been a good deal of attention and some excitement in this past week about the negotiations that Mr. Donovan is conducting to free the Cuban prisoners. There have been all sort of whispers that the U.S. Government is secretly financing whatever supplies are to be given Castro. Could you comment at all on that?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think it is important to understand that Mr. Donovan is acting, in the first instance, for Cuban refugees and for the families of the Cuban prisoners. It is true obviously that the United States has an interest and a concern in what may come of his negotiations. It is equally true that those negotiations are, as far as I understand it, not at a stage at which it would be appropriate for me to try to give any clear answer to the kind of question you have stated.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Bundy, in the little more than a minute that we have left, let's try to broaden the horizon briefly beyond Berlin and Cuba. I get repeatedly the argument from the administration—and I must say that it sounds like an impressive one—that the Communists are discovering that communism as an article, or vehicle upon which to ride to world domination, is failing and

that if we can exploit those failures with some forthright strategy of our own, barring some accidental push of a button, we will look at the future confidently. Would you like, in a few seconds, now that I have taken this time, to try to develop that briefly?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, we do believe that Communist power is in trouble in a variety of ways all around the world. There is this sharp confrontation and difference of view and purpose between the two great centers in Moscow and Peking. There is the continuing and persistent and spreading failure of nearly all Communist societies in the agricultural field. There is the obvious fact that the West intends to sustain and maintain its essential positions in Berlin and elsewhere. There is the increasing awareness among neutral states—Guinea is an example—of the problem of getting along with communism. They have problems of their own and it is comforting as we work on ours.

Mr. MORGAN. On that note, Mr. Bundy, thank you for being with us on "Issues and Answers."

THE ANNOUNCER. This has been another in ABC's newsmaking series which brings you the answers to the issues of today.

Next week at this same time our guest will be the West German Foreign Minister, the Honorable Gerhard Schroeder. We hope you will be with us.

ISSUES AND ANSWERS—THE HONORABLE ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERVIEWED BY BOB CLARK, ABC CORRESPONDENT, AND JOHN SCALI, ABC CORRESPONDENT

THE ANNOUNCER. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatrick, here are the issues: How can we be sure all the Soviet missiles are out of Cuba.

Have we guaranteed the Communists an invasion-free sanctuary in the Caribbean?

What does the Cuban crisis reveal about Russia's military might?

You have heard the issues. Now for the answers from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatrick, who is a member of the President's three-man Committee currently negotiating the conclusion of the Cuban crisis. To interview Secretary Gilpatrick, here are ABC Correspondent Bob Clark and with the first question, ABC Correspondent John Scali.

Mr. SCALI. Mr. Secretary, welcome to "Issues and Answers".

It seems to me that our inspection of the Soviet missiles at sea, as the missiles leave Cuba, really constitutes no more than a peek. How can we be sure that the Soviets haven't left any missiles behind?

Mr. GILPATRICK. Mr. Scali, we never knew how many missiles were brought into Cuba. The Soviets said there were 42. We have counted 42 going out. We saw fewer than 42. Until we have so-called onsite inspection of the island of Cuba we could never be sure that 42 was the maximum number that the Soviets brought into Cuba.

Mr. SCALI. Well, Mr. Secretary, were all these missiles medium-range and intermediate-range or just one kind?

Mr. GILPATRICK. The missiles that we saw and the missiles which have been removed are the medium-range. That is about 1,020 miles range. We never saw any IRBM's for which sites were being prepared, but for which no missiles apparently were put into place.

Mr. CLARK. How about the Soviet jet bombers in Cuba, are we going to insist that they go too?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We regard them as offensive weapons.

They have strategic capabilities similar to our own B-47's. They are no older. They

can carry 6,000 or 7,000 pounds of high explosives a range of 700 or 800 miles which would reach portions of the United States and other Latin American countries, and we think they clearly fall within the weapons we regard as offensive which was what we aim to remove from Cuba.

Mr. CLARK. How serious are we about their removal at this stage? Would we really fire up the Cuban crisis again to be sure that these bombers are taken out of Cuba?

Mr. GILPATRICK. Our objective remains to remove that kind of a threat from Cuba.

Mr. SCALI. Well, Mr. Secretary, if there is no on-site inspection, plus a look for example into caves to see whether there are any hidden offensive weapons, will we stand by our pledge not to invade Cuba?

Mr. GILPATRICK. Our pledge in the President's statement to Premier Khrushchev is twofold. It is that once the Soviet commitments have been fulfilled or arrangements satisfactory to that end have been made, we will lift the blockade and we will offer assurances against the invasion of Cuba.

Our obligations do not come into play, however, until the Soviets have fully carried out their commitments and as of the present time there has only been a partial fulfillment. They have simply removed what they say were the missiles that were brought in. Beyond that their performance has not yet gone.

Mr. SCALI. Well, what can we say to them when the Soviet come back to us and say "Well, we have tried to talk Castro into giving up these bombers and he won't"?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We hold the Soviets responsible for the types of military equipment which it has furnished to Castro and as of the present time we regard the removal of those bombers as within the capacity of the Soviets to bring about. What future developments may tell, I am not in a position to judge.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, aerial reconnaissance has been our most valuable way, first of detecting the presence of the Soviet missile bases and then of assuring that the bases had been dismantled and that the missiles were being moved out. How long do we plan to keep up this aerial survey?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We regard aerial surveillance as a part of our inherent self-defense, a means of protecting our country as we would through any form of intelligence collection. The extent to which we will need to rely on continued air surveillance over Cuba will depend again on what the nature of the threat is that remains in Cuba after the Soviets have completed, if they do complete, the undertakings made by Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy.

Mr. CLARK. Do you mean we might continue aerial inspection even though we were totally assured that the missiles will be removed?

Mr. GILPATRICK. As I say, the conduct of aerial surveillance is part of our overall intelligence collection system and we never are going to bargain away any part of our right of self-defense, which includes the conduct of aerial surveillance. I do not know as of today what the need would be in the future for a particular type or a particular frequency of aerial surveillance over Cuba or any other foreign country.

Mr. SCALI. Mr. Secretary, nothing much has been said lately about those 5,000 or so Soviet military technicians that went to Cuba with many of these weapons. If I recall the Pentagon did say that it saw several hundred young Soviets aboard one of the freighters leaving Cuba. What has happened to them? Are they leaving? Have they left?

Mr. GILPATRICK. We have seen a number—several hundred in fact, Mr. Scali, boarding ships, or on board ships and we believe that

to each other. Neither one clouds the other and I think they are both of very great importance.

Mr. SCALLI. Mr. Bundy, what do you think of Foreign Minister Schoeder's idea that the Western allies ask Russia to join in a permanent conference on the Berlin and German issues and that this be at a deputy foreign ministers level?

Mr. BUNDY. Well this is an idea in which there has been a good deal of interest, both in Bonn and in other parts of the Federal Republic and here in the United States. We believe that it is useful to maintain contact and to maintain communication and to keep a serious discussion going in the constant effort to see if we can't make a settlement that meets the legitimate interests of all, and therefore I would think that is a sensible proposal and one which deserves consideration and which we hope would be received with attention and respect on the other side.

Mr. SCALLI. Mayor Willy Brandt on this program last week also strongly endorsed the idea of a referendum in West Berlin, to put the West Berliners on record as wanting to keep Allied troops in West Berlin. How does that idea strike you?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, we believe that the interest and the rights of the West in Berlin, while they rest legally and by historic right upon the occupation status, rest also in an important sense upon the will and purpose of the people of West Berlin. We think that both of these kinds of rights are of great significance and if it should turn out in the view of the Mayor and Senate of West Berlin and other authorities concerned with this problem that a plebiscite was a good way at a certain point of registering the feeling of the people of West Berlin, their honest feeling about what they want, I myself think that this might be a very constructive step.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Bundy, it would be astonishing, I suppose, to expect allies, particularly in what we refer to as peacetime, to be completely in accord on how you approach a given problem, even one as big as Berlin.

The fact is, I gather, though, that there is a great deal of difference between us on the one side, London, Paris, and Bonn.

Do you think that this administration would, if it felt necessary, step out ahead to honor our commitment militarily in Berlin if it felt it necessary?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think you perhaps a little exaggerate the degree of difference there is on the essentials of the problem of Berlin and the wider problem of Germany. It is certainly true that there have been historically over a 15-year period, tactical differences and differences in emphasis and it is always important and it becomes more important when there are times of higher tension to work together closely to try to limit those differences or eliminate them and to try to present a common front.

We would be very reluctant, and we don't believe there is any call for a prediction that we are going to find ourselves in a situation in which at a moment of decisive test we would not all be together. But I would have to add that, if it should come to such a point, which we do not anticipate, the United States does intend to honor its own obligations.

Mr. MORGAN. This I suppose is—in the public mind this crisis or this possible crisis in Berlin is overshadowed by Cuba. Do you think there is a possibility that the Russians are deliberately screwing up the lines of tension on Berlin in an effort to make a diversion or the other way around, that Cuba is a diversion preoccupying the American people away from the main bullseye of attention?

Mr. BUNDY. We believe that it is important to deal with both of these problems seri-

ously and as far as we can effectively. We do not believe either one should be regarded as a lever against the other. I myself would not on the whole be of the view that the Soviet moves in Cuba are motivated in the way that you suggest. I certainly do not believe that we are going to be dissuaded from meeting our responsibilities as defined by the President, both in Berlin and in Cuba, by any hypothetical connection between the two.

Mr. SCALLI. Mr. Bundy, it is obvious that Cuba is not being eliminated from the election campaign in the United States. How much damage, if any, does continued harping on this in an election year cause to the administration's conduct of foreign policy?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, I don't think one should put all discussion of Cuba in the same box. There are serious and responsible commentators and observers in and out of politics who have said important things, and it is quite proper that they should, whether or not there is an election campaign going on.

As to other kinds of things to which the President referred yesterday in describing the views of one Republican Senator on Cuba, which he thought were inappropriate and excessive and undesirable, it seems to me best to leave the President's comments to speak for themselves.

Mr. SCALLI. Much attention has been centered lately, sir, on the activities of Cuban exile groups in attacking or claiming to attack shipping and Cuban coastal areas. Can the administration argue effectively, do you think, that it has no control over these exile groups, many of whom are based in and around Florida, and isn't there the danger that one of the forays by one of these outfits may involve us in a serious international incident?

Mr. BUNDY. You have raised a difficult and a serious question. Under the terms of the joint resolution of the Congress and also I think in terms of the natural sympathies of all Americans it is very difficult to withhold understanding and a feeling of a certain sympathy for people who are trying in their own way, or appear to be trying in their own way, to restore the liberties of Cuba. At the same time there is a responsibility on us and the balance between these considerations is a difficult one.

I don't think you should assume that every mile of the U.S. coastline even at best is really very easily patrolled or controlled. It is not as simple as that. But this is a different problem and while we do not—there is no way in which the United States can maintain control over the many scores of thousands of Cuban refugees and the many scores of groups of organized Cubans or partly organized Cubans. It is true that this problem of relationship is a difficult one.

Mr. MORGAN. I want to bind two of the points that Scall made into one question, if I may.

That is this: He mentioned the fact that, unfortunately or not, inevitably, the Cuban situation is occupying time in the congressional campaign.

Secondly, these refugee raids so to speak are very difficult, if not impossible to, as you point out, to control at least totally. But aren't those two facts taken together, policies goaded if you please by opposition in this case, in criticizing the Kennedy administration; politics goaded by the campaign and the unpredictability of refugee activity—don't those things combine to almost force more direct action by the administration on Cuba?

Mr. BUNDY. I certainly don't believe that the President intends to be forced by anybody or by any period of time or by any moment of debate into decisions different from those which he regards as in the national interest in a matter of this kind.

I think there just is no doubt that the responsibility for decision, as the joint resolution of Congress makes clear, rests with him and equally in my experience of the way he goes about this kind of problem, there is no doubt that he will make decisions of this sort in the light of much wider and larger considerations than the, I agree, difficult, complex and wearing temporary issues which you have mentioned.

Mr. SCALLI. Mr. Bundy, in that connection, Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON has given two speeches in which he says flatly, if I remember his exact words, that the policy of the Kennedy administration is to "get rid of Castro."

This seems to be a little further than President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk have gone. Is this the policy of the Administration at this time?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think the policy of the administration—I wouldn't agree with you that there is any wedge between the Vice President, the President and the Secretary of State.

Mr. SCALLI. It is just that they haven't used those words.

Mr. BUNDY. I certainly don't intend to join with you in trying to drive one, Mr. Scall, but I will say this, that I think the Vice President is using clear, short, terse language to describe a general position of the U.S. Government which is that Fidel Castro, who came to power on a wave of popular support in an expectation, and even among most of his own supporters, that there would be reform and freedom and liberty in Cuba, has betrayed that expectation. He has betrayed it in two ways: by imposing a totalitarian tyranny in his own country and by accepting an increasing measure of control and influence by the Soviet power within Cuba. These two acts of betrayal constitute in our view a course of policy with which we cannot sympathize and against which we must range ourselves.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Bundy, given that situation as you interpret it and given what I take to be our general policy without any wedge being involved of trying to isolate Castro's Cuba and eventually get it to collapse internally, how are we doing really, candidly, with our Latin American allies, in persuading them that we need to have them join with us more forcefully and more outwardly in supporting such a policy?

Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think we have made very considerable progress, in stages, since 1960, in ranging, or in succeeding in getting a wide range of countries with quite different interests in a sense, because of the distance at which they find themselves, because of their own size, because of their own particular internal political situations, we have made very considerable progress in sustaining unity in the Western Hemisphere and in developing a constantly stronger view within that hemisphere toward Fidel Castro, and Castro-type communism in Cuba. But it is also clear that in the view of many of these countries the problem is not a problem of overwhelming urgency. They don't see it in quite the same light that we do.

Other countries close to Cuba may feel even more urgently about it than we do. We after all are in no serious danger of internal subversion from Cuba. Other countries are.

Mr. MORGAN. That brings up a point which seems to be worrying a lot of people, and if that, as you say, is true, it hasn't gotten completely across, and that is this interpretation of the military installations in Cuba which the administration emphasis consistently are defensive in nature and not offensive.

Isn't it possible, isn't it really possible that these could be converted into offensive weapons virtually overnight, and if so, what would we do?

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sites with a range of 20 to 25 miles. Quite likely several more such sites will be installed.

CUBA HAS MIGs

Cuba is now estimated to have 80 older type Mig jet aircraft. In addition at least one advanced jet-interceptor has recently been received, and probably several more are in the process of assembly.

This type of advanced jet-interceptor is usually equipped with infrared air-to-air missiles. We estimate that the total of these advanced interceptors in Cuba may eventually reach 25 to 30.

In addition, 16 Komar class guided missile patrol boats, which carry two short-range missiles (11 to 17 miles), were included in recent shipments.

About 4,500 Soviet military specialists have arrived, including construction men and technicians. Unpleasant as may be the spectacle of a Communist-dominated island just off our shores, we should not overlook the fact that Cuba is, at the moment, a small enfeebled country with an incompetent government, a limping economy, and a deteriorating standard of living.

The crash efforts of the Soviet Union to provide the Castro regime with economic technicians and to build up its military defenses is a demonstration of Cuban weakness.

CRISIS ON MOSCOW

Because of the desperate plight of the Cuban economy, Cuba's isolation from the other nations of the hemisphere, and the fear which that isolation has engendered, the Cuban Government has turned itself into a dependency of Moscow.

We may take the events of the past month—regrettable as they may be in many ways—as evidence of the essential soundness of the strategy of isolation that we have pursued toward Cuba over the past 2 years. The additional measures now under consideration with respect to Cuban shipping are part and parcel of that same strategy.

We propose to continue along these lines, taking new measures as the developing situation may require.

But in pursuing this policy—as in pursuing any policy—the United States must never forget that it is engaged in a worldwide struggle and that no policy can be regarded as an end in itself or as existing apart from the whole complex of relationships which give the free world its strength.

ISSUES AND ANSWERS—McGEORGE BUNDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERVIEWED BY EDWARD P. MORGAN, ABC COMMENTATOR, AND JOHN SCALI, ABC STATE DEPARTMENT CORRESPONDENT.

THE ANNOUNCER. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security, here are the issues:

Is there a way to head off a new Berlin crisis?

Have we convinced Khrushchev that we will meet force with force?

What does the United States do if the so-called defensive military buildup becomes offensive?

From Washington, D.C., the American Broadcasting Co. brings you "Issues and Answers." You have heard the issues. Now for the answers from President Kennedy's adviser on military and policy planning. To interview McGeorge Bundy, here are ABC Commentator Edward P. Morgan, and with the first question, ABC's State Department Correspondent, John Scali.

MR. SCALI. Welcome to "Issues and Answers," sir.

Radio Moscow and Soviet publications generally have accused Secretary Rusk, Defense Secretary McNamara, and Attorney General Kennedy and you of creating a war psychosis over Berlin by your speeches, say-

ing that if necessary, Berlin will be defended with nuclear weapons.

What do you have to say in reply to that?

MR. BUNDY. It has always been clear that Berlin would be defended by the Western Powers and in particular by the United States, by all necessary means. We have been saying that to the Soviet Union at intervals since the Second World War and at closer and sharper intervals since Mr. Khrushchev precipitated the new Berlin crisis nearly 4 years ago, and so it doesn't seem to me there is any call for the Soviet to be surprised when at a moment of possibly renewed tension we remind the world and that Government that pressure against our clear and well-defined rights in Berlin is very dangerous.

MR. MORGAN. Mr. Bundy, do you see any merit at all to the suggestion that Foreign Minister Gromyko made at his rather long and rambling news conference in New York yesterday to the effect that the Western Powers ought to patrol the wall?

MR. BUNDY. It seems to me that Mr. Gromyko's proposal implies a failure on the part of—or is the recognition, really, of the failure both of the whole policy of the Soviet Government in East Berlin and East Germany, and of their failure to observe even minimum standards of human decency along the inhuman wall which they have put up.

We have appealed, along with Mayor Brandt, for restraint and for control in the population of West Berlin and that kind of restraint in the face of the most serious kind of provocation has been demonstrated. It seems to me it is not Mr. Gromyko's business to tell us how to order the affairs of West Berlin.

MR. SCALI. Do we have any intention whatever of taking these additional steps on the Western side of the wall?

MR. BUNDY. We will take and have taken appropriate steps to maintain peace and order in West Berlin. The incidents which have in fact caused Mr. Gromyko such pain have occurred in fact in East Berlin.

MR. MORGAN. One thing that seems to be preoccupying many people including people in the Government and people among our allies: Where do these notorious, salami tactics by Mr. Khrushchev end, do they end by our being completely deprived of the sausage or are we able to salvage part of it.

I would like to ask you as a background to that: this question: The administration has made it clear that it will fight for Berlin and fight for Western representation and position in Berlin.

At what point does this showdown come? Is it not possible that he slices the salami right out from under us?

MR. BUNDY. We don't believe so. We believe that the basic rights and interests of the people of West Berlin and of the Western Powers and of the Federal Republic can be sustained, are being sustained, and will be sustained. It is very important here to understand there is a distinction between the existing and operating rights of access, presence, and of life in West Berlin, and the legal rights which apply to the whole city, but which have not been exercised in the main in East Berlin for nearly 15 years.

MR. MORGAN. Do we see the slightest indication of any Soviet give on the situation at all at this point?

MR. BUNDY. I don't think we can say that there has been any significant shift in the substance of the Soviet position. I think there are some indications that the Soviet Government is more interested in continuing discussion than it is in an immediate precipitation of a still more dangerous crisis but it is always dangerous to predict on this point and on the substantive point there is no shift. The Soviet Government still urges upon us all the unacceptable solutions which

is essentially that the West should get out of West Berlin.

MR. SCALI. Mr. Bundy, how does that fit in with the view of many administration officials that after the elections there will be a new and more dangerous phase to the Berlin crisis?

MR. BUNDY. Well, there may well be—there will certainly be a new phase of some sort and it may well be more dangerous. I think myself that there is at some point in the future likely to be a sharper confrontation. This, of course, is a very difficult thing for any of us in Washington to predict. This crisis was created by the Soviet Government. It is the Soviet Government and not the West which will intensify it if it is intensified.

MR. SCALI. Many administration officials have taken to speaking very bluntly about our determination to fight if necessary. Why is it judged wise to repeat this at this particular time? Do you see any sign of perhaps Mr. Khrushchev's maybe misjudging this determination at this time?

MR. BUNDY. There is always the possibility and it is one of the great and continuing dangers of living in the nuclear age, that a government may make a miscalculation which would be tragic for all and not just for that government. There is some evidence that the Soviet Government has been talking—I won't say acting or believing, but talking as if it thought the West might not mean what it has said in Berlin and for that reason and because of the possibility that there may be an intensification of the Berlin issue it has seemed to us important to leave no doubt that we are in Berlin and we propose to stay there.

MR. MORGAN. Is there another possibility, Mr. Bundy: Is this in part—these warnings that Mr. Scali mentioned—an administration reaction to the election campaign itself in which some Republicans obliquely and/or directly are making foreign policy an issue and accusing the administration of being soft on communism?

MR. BUNDY. Well we don't believe that a Berlin issue is in the election or should be in the election. There have been hints from the other side that the best time to settle this would be after the election. We don't believe that. We believe that Americans without regard to party know where they stand on Berlin, are quite willing to discuss it at any time and quite unwilling to be forced out of their basic rights at any time.

MR. MORGAN. What can you tell us of what the public might expect from the visit of two important Germans? As you know, Foreign Minister Schroeder is already here from the West German Government and it was announced yesterday that Chancellor Adenauer would come again on November 7. What do these meetings mean?

MR. BUNDY. Well, I think these are both very important visits and I quite disagree with an interpretation which was in one of the papers this morning that somehow the Chancellor's coming in November makes Foreign Minister Schroeder's visit less important. I think the reverse is the case.

There are very important interests in common between us and the Federal Republic. In each new season of the problem of the confrontation in Berlin and larger problems of the future organization and management of NATO, it is of great importance to us to have continued clear and close understanding between Washington and Bonn. In order to do this we have to sort out and work on the issues, first at the level of the so-called experts and then at the level of Foreign Ministers, which is what will be going on during Mr. Schroeder's visit and then because heads of government are so deeply engaged in these great issues, at the level of the Chancellor and the President. So I think these two visits are complimentary

Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. LAIRD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, it is clear that one of the major problems of the Kennedy administration in winning public support for its policy toward Cuba is the widespread skepticism with which administration pronouncements are received. That the administration recognizes this problem is evidenced by the extraordinary measures taken last week to acquaint the public with the methods used to determine the extent of the military base which the Soviet Union maintains in Cuba. I think that the Department of Defense took a step that was long overdue when it staged its 2-hour telethon on February 6.

I do not intend to comment today on this presentation of the Department of Defense nor on the complex problems of determining accurately the extent of the military buildup in Cuba. Nor do I intend to discuss the question of the adequacy of present administration policy in dealing with a continuing situation that clearly violates the Monroe Doctrine.

Rather, I want to point out some of the reasons why this administration has lost the trust and the confidence of a large part of the people of the United States. The credibility which a government enjoys is determined largely by the accuracy of its statements in the past. It is unfortunately true that many of the assurances given by responsible administration spokesmen about conditions in Cuba in the past have proven to be inaccurate.

In evidence of this statement I am inserting in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, immediately following remarks, the full text of an article by George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, entitled "Does Cuba Comprise a Military Threat to the United States?" This article appeared in the issue of the Washington World dated October 19, 1962—5 days after the first photographs of medium-range missile sites were taken in Cuba. This article follows Secretary Ball's public testimony of October 3, 1962, published by the House Select Committee on Export Control.

I want to insert in full the transcript of a television interview of Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, on the program "Issues and Answers," carried on the American Broadcasting Co. on November 11, 1962.

And finally, I wish to make reference to a televised interview of McGeorge Bundy on the program "Issues and Answers" on October 14, 1962. The text of this interview will follow my remarks.

The inaccuracies in these documents are so patent that they need little comment. The inconsistencies between statements which they contain and statements of other leaders of the administration are so glaring as to make understandable the skepticism of the general public when the administration talks about Cuba. In fact, this skepticism can be justified on the strength of a statement of a responsible official of

the administration. Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, speaking at a Sigma Delta Chi dinner in New York City on December 6, 1962, said that when the administration is "on the defensive under our political system I would always be suspicious of what it said—I do not expect virtue to come out of men—complete virtue—or even maybe 75 percent virtue. If any of us are virtuous 51 percent of the time, that I see, it is a good record and in politics an amazing record. So I would start out on that premise."

Let me point out briefly some of the major inaccuracies in the documents which I am inserting in the Record. McGeorge Bundy, speaking on October 14, 1962, 6 or 8 hours after photographs that revealed the presence of missiles in Cuba had been taken, said:

I know there is no present evidence, and I think there is no present likelihood that the Cubans and the Cuban Government and the Soviet Government would in combination attempt to install a major offensive capability. So far, everything that has been delivered in Cuba falls within the categories of aid which the Soviet Union has provided, for example, to neutral states like Egypt, or Indonesia, and I should not be surprised to see additional military assistance of that sort. That is not going to turn an island of 6 million people with 5,000 or 6,000 Soviet technicians and specialists into a major threat to the United States, and I believe most of the American people do not share the views of the few who have acted as if suddenly this kind of military support created a mortal threat to us. It does not.

Mr. Gilpatric's statement contains two passages that are worthy of notice. Mr. Gilpatric, unlike Secretary McNamara, did not say that he was sure beyond reasonable doubt that all missiles placed in Cuba had been removed. Mr. Gilpatric responded in a more cautious way to the question: How can we be sure the Soviets have not left any missiles behind? saying:

We never knew how many missiles were brought into Cuba. The Soviets said there were 42. We have counted 42 going out. We saw fewer than 42. Until we have so-called on-site inspection of the island of Cuba we could never be sure that 42 was the maximum number that the Soviets brought into Cuba.

Mr. Gilpatric further said:

They [the Russians] have simply removed what they say were the missiles that were brought in.

Secondly, Mr. Gilpatric on November 11, 1962, denied that this Government was even considering closing down American missile bases in Turkey or in Italy, and he repudiated the suggestion that missile bases in Turkey were no longer important. In spite of Mr. Gilpatric's protests that "all the bases we have today are important to us" and that "we have no thought of giving up any of our overseas bases," less than 2 months later the word was out in the press that an official decision to remove missiles from both Turkey and Italy had been made.

Mr. Ball's article published October 19, 1962, said:

In the last few weeks we have read much in the newspapers of the military buildup

of Cuba by the Soviet Union. Quite clearly it does not constitute a threat to the United States.

At the time this went to print the photographs of missile sites had been taken and a decision had been made that the situation in Cuba constituted a serious threat to the security of this country. On October 3 Mr. Ball testified that we had "no evidence" of Russian missiles in Cuba. Testimony of top officials now shows that we had evidence in September.

Mr. Ball also reported "about 4,500 Soviet military specialists" were in Cuba, "including construction men and technicians." We are now told that there were about five times that number in Cuba at the time Mr. Ball's article appeared.

The Defense Department on October 19 and again on October 20 issued denials that there were either offensive missiles or bombers in Cuba.

The foregoing record indicates with abundant clarity why a large part of the American people question the word of this administration. The new policy of news management has in fact become a policy of mismanagement.

The article and television interviews follow:

[From the Washington World, Oct. 19, 1962]
DOES CUBA COMPRISE A MILITARY THREAT?—No

(By George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State)

Our policy toward Cuba is based upon the assessment that Cuba does not today constitute a military threat to the United States. Without doubt it is an economic burden for the Sino-Soviet bloc. It has value to the bloc primarily as a base for the subversive activities of international communism in the Western Hemisphere.

The policy of the U.S. Government is directed toward nullifying Cuba's usefulness as a source of infection for international communism, while at the same time rendering it more costly for the Sino-Soviet bloc to maintain it for that purpose.

Cuba today is almost totally dependent upon the Soviet Union for its economic livelihood. Three-fourths of Cuba's trade is with the Communist bloc, and this percentage is increasing as other channels of the trade dry up.

In the last few weeks we have read much in the newspapers of the military buildup of Cuba by the Soviet Union. Quite clearly it does not constitute a threat to the United States.

Since July, when the volume of Soviet military shipments to Cuba suddenly vaulted upward, 85 shiploads arrived in Cuban ports. Many of them carried military items, supplies, and personnel.

These shipments have consisted, in part, of types of weapons previously delivered to the Cuban armed forces, including more tanks, self-propelled guns, and other ground force equipment.

The major tonnage in recent shipments, however, has been devoted to SA-2's, surface-to-air missiles (SAM's), together with all the related gear and equipment necessary for their installation and operation.

To date 15 SAM sites have been established in the island. We estimate the total may eventually reach 25. These are anti-aircraft missiles having a slant range of 20 to 25 miles.

In addition, three and possibly four missile sites of a different type have been identified. These sites are similar to known Soviet coastal defense missile sites that are believed to accommodate antishipping mis-

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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To train enlisted women marines, the 3d Recruit Training Battalion at Parris Island, S.C. was activated. Women officer candidates were sent to Quantico, Va. during the summer months to receive their training.

Today's women marines are eligible to serve in 26 occupational fields containing 125 job specialties.

Some of the occupational fields to which they are assigned are: Personnel and administration, operational communications, supply, intelligence, logistics, drafting and surveying, disbursing, electronics, training devices, data processing, flight operations, photography, air control, aerology, and public information.

Women marines serve at every major post and station along the east coast and in California. They also man stateside recruiting billets and perform overseas duty in Hawaii, London, Naples, and Paris.

Among the "firsts" recorded by the "lady leathernecks" last year are the following:

First. Lance Cpl. Betty L. Field became the first woman marine recruit to receive the American Spirit Honor Medal since 1955. Traditionally this is awarded to the outstanding Marine Corps recruit who best embodies during basic training the qualities of leadership and all-round excellence.

Second. Pfc. Chariss Corbett attained the highest average ever compiled in the operations clerical course of the Aviation Storekeeper School, NATTC, Memphis, Tenn., with a 91.5 average.

Third. Nancy M. Ash, a 1960 graduate of women officers candidate course and a Mount Holyoke alumna, was commissioned a second lieutenant in London, England. Lieutenant Ash completed a year's postgraduate work at Oxford and has now reported to Marine Corps schools, Quantico, for further training.

Fourth. First Lt. Wilma Atby, a flight clearance operations officer at El Toro, Calif., became the first woman marine to break the sound barrier while a passenger in a Marine jet trainer TF-9J.

Although the number of women in the Marine Corps is relatively small—its legal limit is 2 percent of the overall strength of the corps—their selection and training provides the Marine Corps with a growing and continuing nucleus of well-trained, professionally minded women ready to meet mobilization needs.

Today a total of approximately 150 women marine officers serve on active duty, in all ranks from warrant officer through the 1 full colonel who is always the Director. A total of 1,700 enlisted women are also on active duty.

As they celebrate their 20th anniversary, women marines, Regular and reservists, continue to contribute to their own chapter of the history of the Marine Corps.

THE KERR-MILLS ACT

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. KARSTEN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

(Mr. KARSTEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include a newspaper editorial.)

Mr. KARSTEN. Mr. Speaker, much has been said in recent weeks about the success of the Kerr-Mills Act in meeting the problem of paying for medical care for our senior citizens. Oddly enough, some of these claims have been put forward by people from my own State of Missouri. Some of the claims have even found their way into the columns of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. I say this is odd because the State of Missouri has no medical assistance for the aged program authorized by the Kerr-Mills Act passed by the Congress in 1960 as a substitute for the medical care for the aged program under social security and railroad retirement which I along with many of my distinguished colleagues, supported at that time, and still support.

I can understand how my good friends from New York find cause for rejoicing in the accomplishments of the Kerr-Mills Act, since, according to the latest report issued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare covering expenditures under the program in November 1962, 29.9 percent of all the \$11.5 million of Federal funds granted that month went into that one State. But not a cent of this Federal grant money for MAA has gone to help the elderly ill in my State. I am not proud of this fact. I am only offering the observation that it is strange some appear to find in Kerr-Mills the panacea for all the health problems of the aging in my State and in the Nation.

In the St. Louis Post-Dispatch an editorial appeared on January 29, entitled, "Kerr-Mills as a Flimflam." I should like, at this point in my remarks, for that editorial to be reproduced:

KERR-MILLS AS A FLIMFLAM

With the debate on social security hospitalization warming up, opponents again are presenting the Kerr-Mills Act, already in force, as the better alternative. They also imply that those who support President Kennedy's so-called medicare plan would undermine Kerr-Mills. Republican Representative BYRNES of Wisconsin, for example, is accusing the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of "dragging its feet" on Kerr-Mills. This is a debater's flimflam which should no longer obscure discussion.

Kerr-Mills is fine—for its purpose. Under this law, the Government offers substantial help to cooperating States for the care of the needy sick. The cost has made the States rather slow to sign up. Yet in 1962 the Government's contribution rose from \$9,300,000 to \$24,200,000, and the number benefited rose from 46,247 in the previous year to 114,657. Even greater progress is necessary if most of the sickness among the poor is to be treated. And, who can be against that?

Yet except insofar as Kerr-Mills is being used as camouflage, it has no very real bearing on the administration proposal. Kerr-Mills is for medical paupers. Social security hospital insurance would help people in their working years to avoid this pauperism in their old age. Inadequate as its provisions may be, they are meant to enable people over 65 to maintain their dignity and self-respect. Kerr-Mills is a giveaway, a laudable one, while hospital insurance would help people to pay their own bills with their own money.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the opinion the editorial expresses that, "Kerr-Mills is fine—for its purposes." Its rightful purpose, however, is not to constitute the first line of defense against the ravaging cost of illness for our older citizens, but, like all of our public assistance programs since the enactment of the basic social security program nearly 28 years ago—it is a last resort.

Perhaps it is their sound judgment of this rightful role of Kerr-Mills that has thus far kept the good citizens of Missouri from acceptance of this program. I have no doubt that once the Congress has adopted a basic system of protection against the high costs of health care through social security which President Kennedy advocates, the great State of Missouri will adopt an implementation of Kerr-Mills as an appropriate supplement.

(Mr. FRIEDEL (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. FRIEDEL'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. FLOOD (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. FLOOD'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

A PRACTICE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS

(Mr. SICKLES (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, the junior bar section of the District of Columbia Bar Association in cooperation with the Georgetown University legal internship program is offering a unique practice institute to aid volunteer attorneys in defending the poor in criminal cases. Hundreds of indigent defendants are represented each year by volunteer lawyers who are experts in their own field of law, but who have little day-to-day experience in the defense of criminal cases. To insure that every person accused of crime gets expert representation, on February 16 and 17, 1963, a criminal practice institute will be held at Georgetown University's Gaston Hall dealing with the law and tactics of Federal criminal trials. It is expected that this program will go a long way toward insuring equal justice for all regardless of their financial status. The bar association in the Georgetown legal internship program deserves to be commended for their fine effort in this regard. It is hoped that this unique project will be taken up by other bar associations and law schools throughout the country.

Cuba ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT OF NEWS CAUSES PROBLEMS

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from